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REGULATION  AND  THE  NEW  POLITICS  OF
(ENERGY)  MARKET  ENTRY
David B. Spence*
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of market entry changes the way markets allocate the
costs and benefits of economic activity.  For example, society chooses to regu-
late entry into the medical profession and the introduction of new
pharmaceuticals to the market in order to protect patients from harm or the
marketing of new securities in order to protect investors from fraud.  And so
it is with the energy industry: we regulate entry into the energy sector by way
of siting regimes1 for new energy infrastructure; these regimes, in turn, steer
private capital toward investments that ensure the wide availability of a more
reliable, affordable, and cleaner energy supply.2  These siting regimes are
part of a broader energy regulatory system that aims to control the behavior
of monopolies (public utility law),3 to prevent a wasteful tragedy of the com-
© 2019 David B. Spence.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Baker Botts Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law and
McCombs School of Business.  The author wishes to thank Brooke Holleman, Madeline
Gould, Tiffany Lietz, Douglas Daffin, Jenny Sauer, Matthew Haley, Kristin Cook, Olivia
Loa, Morgan Moore, Ashutosh Singh, Brandon Curtis, Ankita Nayak, and Abhivan
Sridharan for their research assistance in connection with this project.  The author would
also like to thank participants in research paper colloquia and seminars at the Georgetown
University Law Center, the University of Texas School of Law, the University of Florida,
University of California at Berkeley Boalt Hall, and the UCLA School of Law for their
feedback on earlier versions of this Article.
1 As used here the term “siting regimes” is intended to subsume the various state and
federal statutory permitting regimes applicable to energy projects.  Those regimes are
described, infra Part I.
2 For a summary of those laws, see infra Section I.B.
3 The notion that public utility regulation was driven in large part by the desire to
ensure a reliable and affordable energy supply is of course disputed (to a greater or lesser
degree) by public choice scholars and economic historians, who have characterized energy
regulation as primarily the product of rent seeking by utility companies.  For a summary
history of public utility regulation and support for the public interest explanation for pub-
lic utility law, see David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 141–48 (2012), and William
Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1635–51 (2014).
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mons (oil and gas law),4 and to force companies to internalize the externali-
ties of energy production (environmental law).5  Each of these bodies of
regulation represents a social choice to intervene in the market—one born
of public dissatisfaction with the market allocation of the costs and benefits
of energy production.  Importantly, these regulatory regimes are twentieth-
century creations, products of the regulatory impulse that supported the so-
called “New Deal consensus.”6
Bipartisan support for that kind of lightly regulated capitalism is weaken-
ing in the twenty-first century.  Today the two major political parties have
become ideologically more homogenous and distant (from one another)
than at any time in the modern regulatory era.  The Republican Party, also
known as the Grand Old Party (GOP) has moved sharply to the ideological
right, and has grown hostile to most regulation—a phenomenon that began
in the late twentieth century; by contrast, Democratic Party support for the
regulatory state remains firm, and the party’s progressive wing may have an
appetite for stronger regulation.7  At the same time, the rise of instantaneous
digital communication is increasing the speed at which people can be mobil-
ized for political action and the speed at which ideas (good or bad, true or
false) are transmitted through the polity.  These twenty-first century changes
in the political environment are profound, and together they suggest the pos-
sibility that conflict over the siting of energy projects is getting more intense
and more frequent over time.
Understanding this new politics of market entry matters because the
American energy system depends upon private capital to serve the public’s
changing energy needs.  Atypically among nations, the American govern-
ment has never taken primary responsibility for providing energy infrastruc-
ture;8 government has instead used regulation to invite, and to steer, private
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES
36–38, 38 n.27 (1971) (discussing regulatory and statutory efforts to control economic
waste from overuse in the oil and gas industry); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson,
The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899 (2005) (discussing the
objectives of regulations as preventing waste).
5 For a summary of the “internalizing externalities” explanation for environmental
law, see generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MAKING THE COMMONS
WORK (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992); and THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS (Bonnie J.
McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
6 “New Deal consensus” refers to the post–World War II bipartisan acceptance of the
regulatory state. See DAVID S. BROWN, RICHARD HOFSTADTER (2006) (summarizing the ori-
gins and essence of Hofstadter’s “New Deal consensus”).
7 See infra Section I.C, for a fuller discussion of both of these phenomena.
8 An early twentieth-century “public power” movement urged government ownership
in the electricity sector, but investor-owned utility ownership became the norm.  For a
good description of the public power movement, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYN-
DON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 518–28 (1982).  Today’s municipal utilities, serving
about 13% of American electric customers, are vestiges of that movement, as are federal
power agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority.  For a summary of existing public
power providers, see Where Is Public Power, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://
www.publicpower.org/where-public-power (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
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investment in energy services.  Historically, that regulation encouraged the
investments necessary to bring reliable, affordable energy to consumers.
Today’s energy facility siting regimes seek to balance the general public’s
interest in a reliable, affordable energy supply against the interests of locals
and others who bear most of the social and environmental costs of hosting
energy facilities.  How regulators strike that balance implicates fundamental
“government vs. market” and “national vs. local” divides that feed partisan
ideological polarization.9  Furthermore, as climate science implies an increas-
ingly urgent need to transition away from fossil fuels and toward a cleaner
energy mix,10 the operation of energy facility siting regimes will influence
the speed at which that transition occurs.  Any clean energy transition will
produce identifiable winners and losers as jobs and their economic ripple
effects move from old to new industries and locales.11  For all these reasons,
it makes sense that the siting of new energy infrastructure would provoke
increasingly intense conflict.
Understanding how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) participate
in siting proceedings for new energy infrastructure today can illuminate ways
in which the regulatory environment is changing.  The idea that regulation is
a rigged system, dominated by business and unfriendly to NGO perspectives,
seems to be more widely held among twenty-first century populists.12  How-
ever, that view is belied by a substantial empirical literature that paints a
more qualified and nuanced picture of business influence over policymaking
9 Political science measures of congressional ideology suggest that this is so. See
Royce Carroll et al., DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW,
https://legacy.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2015) (“[T]he first
dimension can be interpreted in most periods as government intervention in the economy
or liberal-conservative in the modern era.”).
10 Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-
report-2040.html.
11 Moreover, there is a clear partisan divide among elected officials over the policy
implications of climate science.  The opposition of congressional Republicans and Presi-
dent Trump to regulation of greenhouse gas emissions has been thoroughly documented.
Rank-and-file Republicans may be more supportive of climate regulation, but so far there is
no evidence that that preference is influencing elected national Republicans. See Leaf Van
Boven & David Sherman, Actually, Republicans Do Believe in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (July
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/opinion/sunday/republicans-climate-
change.html.
12 In the 2016 presidential campaign, this idea was expressed first by candidate Bernie
Sanders and later echoed by candidate Donald Trump.  It is finding resonance among
2020 presidential aspirants as well. See Jonathan Tamari, The System Is ‘Corrupt,’ ‘Rigged,’ Not
‘for Working People’: Why 2020 Democrats Sometimes Sound a Bit Like Trump, PHILA. INQUIRER
(July 7, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/democrats-2020-populist-rhetoric-donald-
trump-elizabeth-warren-bernie-sanders-20190707.html.  For recent, popular accounts of
corporate/elite dominance, see generally NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS (2017)
and JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY (2016).
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and regulation.13  While businesses enjoy certain resource and organiza-
tional advantages in the contest to shape policy, those advantages do not
always or systematically translate into probusiness outcomes.14  By contrast,
NGO participation in siting proceedings and other regulatory processes is
less well studied.  An existing literature examining “not in my backyard” (or
“NIMBY”) groups15 suggests that local opposition to the siting of polluting
facilities has implications for how society regulates and prioritizes risks, as
well as environmental justice implications, and that politically weak groups
have been disadvantaged by siting regimes.16  However, much of that work
predates the era of extreme partisan ideological polarization, heightened
urgency over climate change, and instantaneous digital communication in
American politics.  Therefore, we might ask how these more recent trends
affect today’s siting conflicts.  How is the new politics of market entry differ-
ent?  Does it create stronger or weaker barriers to entry for fossil fuel infra-
structure?  For new clean energy infrastructure?
Understanding the differences between local and national NGOs can
help answer these questions.  For example, because local opposition to all
kinds of energy projects can be rational, siting conflicts involving clean
energy infrastructure pose particular strategic dilemmas for national environ-
mental NGOs.  On the one hand, an environmental NGO’s public stance in
favor of a decarbonized energy mix suggests that it ought to support new
wind farms, solar farms, and the transmission lines that facilitate clean energy
development, even in the presence of local opposition.  On the other hand,
the growth of the modern environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s
was built around local opposition to new infrastructure.17  The seminal cases
in modern environmentalism—cases like Sierra Club v. Morton,18 Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,19 and Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission20—involved opposition to infrastructure projects
and demands that local environmental impacts be given greater weight in
decisionmaking.  That history may make environmental NGOs instinctively
reluctant to actively support energy projects—even clean energy projects—
13 See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 3.  For a relatively recent review of the political science
literature on business influence over policymaking, see TIMOTHY WERNER, PUBLIC FORCES
AND PRIVATE POLITICS IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 1–16 (2012).
14 See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (discussing literature about environ-
mental justice); infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text (discussing literature about risk
regulation).
15 The NIMBY label originally had pejorative connotation, some of which may have
dissipated over time; nevertheless, I avoid it here, and use the terms “local opposition” or
“NGO” instead.
16 See infra Section I.B.
17 For a description of which cases academics and practitioners consider the seminal
cases in the history of environmental law, see James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Who’s Number
One?, ENVTL. F., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 36.
18 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
20 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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over local opposition.  This phenomenon may explain cases like the Sierra
Club opposition to utility scale solar farms in the Mojave Desert21 and the
Northern Pass Transmission Project which would have transmitted Canadian
hydroelectric power into New England, a region woefully lacking in wind and
solar generation.22
For all of these reasons, this Article examines the dynamics of NGO
opposition to proposed energy infrastructure in the twenty-first century, spe-
cifically the tactics and issue arguments used by NGOs to oppose new energy
infrastructure.  The analysis is built around a data set comprising information
more than four hundred NGOs whose missions include active opposition to
one or more of nine different types of energy projects, including various
types of fossil fuel infrastructure, renewable energy facilities, and smart grid
technology.
Part I of this Article explains the legal context in which NGOs may chal-
lenge the approval of new energy projects.  Siting regulation typically hands
federal or state energy regulators broad discretion to approve or disapprove
new projects, but also requires most projects to secure any of several ancil-
lary, issue-specific environmental approvals.  Thus, NGOs opposing energy
projects can contest siting decisions on a variety of grounds in a variety of
regulatory settings (given sufficient expertise and resources).  Part II
describes the data set at the heart of this analysis, which includes information
about (1) the tactics each NGO uses to oppose energy projects, such as litiga-
tion, direct lobbying, mobilizing public participation in siting proceedings,
protests, or economic boycotts, and (2) the issue arguments advanced by
each NGO to mobilize opposition, such as those based upon the project’s
economic impacts, health and environmental risks, or environmental justice.
The data are limited to siting disputes arising between 2000 and 2017.  Part II
also suggests some informal hypotheses about when we might expect to see
particular tactics or issue arguments predominate across the different project
categories and NGO types.
Some key findings from the data are reported in Part III.  First, NGOs
tend to focus on mobilizing the broader public to lobby decisionmakers
(rather than, say, to litigate, boycott, or protest), and to do so around envi-
ronmental and health risk issues.  Interestingly, that conclusion holds true
across all project types, fossil fuel and clean energy projects alike.  Second,
local NGOs were more likely to engage in risk amplification—that is, to
advance claims about health risks that lacked solid scientific support—while
national groups tended to be more circumspect about the way they discussed
risk.  Third, the tactical and substantive similarities among NGOs within pro-
21 For a description of the break between local California environmentalists and the
national Sierra Club over these projects, see John Monsen, Protecting the Mojave Desert’s
Wildlife, SIERRA CLUB ANGELES CHAPTER (May 24, 2019), https://angeles.sierraclub.org/
news/blog/2019/05/protecting_mojave_desert’s_wildlife.
22 See Catherine Corkery, Northern Pass: A Burden Too Heavy for NH, SIERRA CLUB (Nov.
13, 2015), https://www.sierraclub.org/new-hampshire/northern-pass-editorial (describing
and encouraging the state to reject the Northern Pass).
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ject categories (particularly fossil fuel project categories) implies the possibil-
ity of coordination among NGOs.  Together, these findings seem consistent
with the twenty-first century hyperpolarized, hyperconnected political envi-
ronment.  Mass mobilization is more efficient and effective than ever: digital
communication tools enable NGOs to transmit messages almost costlessly,
and to target audiences that are particularly receptive to individual messages.
NGOs choose risk-based appeals because they resonate: if local NGOs need
to build a broader base of support for their cause in order to improve the
probability of victory before government decisionmakers, this approach
makes sense.  Part III also reports some data on the geographic distribution
of NGO opposition to energy projects, which seems to be loosely correlated
with both development intensity and political ideology.
Part IV places the results described in Part III in the context of ongoing
scholarly debates about the politics of regulation.  As always, NGOs and firms
engage in a tug of war, each seeking to push or pull regulators toward a
particular conclusion.  In an era of inexpensive renewable energy, many find
it untroubling that NGOs can more effectively use risk-based arguments to
mobilize the public against new fossil fuel infrastructure.  What is worrying is
the possibility that those sophisticated digital communication tools enable
NGOs (and others) to exploit risk perception biases to more effectively
amplify perceived risk, which in turn could push regulators to produce siting
decisions that have counterproductive effects.  These can include environmen-
tally counterproductive effects, as when opposition to transmission lines can
(and does) deny consumers access to cheap, clean wind and solar energy, or
when opposition to natural gas pipelines increases both energy prices and
reliance on dirtier diesel fuel or coal.23  As with other policy debates, modern
digital politics can enhance misunderstanding,24 move partisans and activists
toward the ideological poles,25 and make it more difficult for regulators to
make sensible decisions about tradeoffs at the heart of any transition to a
much greener energy mix.
I. NGOS AND SITING ENERGY PROJECTS
Relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to the dynamics of
NGO mobilization across different energy project types.  One reason may be
that the variety of issues and regulatory institutions subsumed by that task
23 See infra notes 255–56 and accompanying text (describing this very phenomenon in
New England).  We might speculate that regulators would be more sensitive to these indi-
rect environmental costs than national NGOs pursuing a longer-term decarbonization
strategy.  Those NGOs may see these adverse environmental consequences as an accept-
able short-term cost in exchange for the prevention of new fossil fuel infrastructure that
might “lock in” reliance on fossil fuels for decades.  For discussion of this carbon lock-in
issue, see infra Part III.
24 For a recent meta-analysis of the literature on belief in misinformation, see Dietram
A. Scheufele & Nicole M. Krause, Science Audiences, Misinformation, and Fake News, 116 PROC.
NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 7662 (2019).
25 For data supporting this claim, see infra Section I.C.
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make the problem seem intractable to social scientists: exploring conflict
within a single set of risk issues or a single regulatory regime preserves
degrees of freedom for the modeler.  Or it may be that the dominant frames
in the national political discourse—pitting fossil fuels against renewables—
may divert scholars’ attention from commonalities between opposition to a
wind farm and opposition to pipelines, for example.  Still, the relative dearth
of cross-technology studies of energy siting conflicts is somewhat striking
given their prominence across a wide variety of technological, social, and
environmental contexts recently.  While some energy technologies—nuclear
power, in particular—have long provoked intense opposition, the twenty-first
century has seen a succession of high-profile energy facility siting disputes
around which large and diverse groups of people have mobilized to oppose
different kinds of energy infrastructure.  For more than a decade in the early
2000s conflict over the siting of the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound
pitted locals against one another, dividing national environmental groups
and providing fodder for late night comics and documentarians.26  The 2010
documentary Gasland27 triggered fears of air and water contamination from
oil and gas production using hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”)28 and mobil-
ized hundreds of local pockets of intense opposition to fracking29 across the
country.30  At around the same time radiation fears triggered localized pock-
ets of intense opposition to the installation of smart meters in homes, partic-
ularly in northern California,31 but also in Maine,32 Texas,33 and other
communities across the nation.34  Most recently, groups like 350.org were
able to mobilize massive, nationwide opposition to the Keystone XL Pipeline
as an expression of opposition to reliance on fossil fuels, and particularly oil
26 See CAPE SPIN!: AN AMERICAN POWER STRUGGLE (Rebirth Productions 2014) (humor-
ously depicting all of the conflict’s byproducts).
27 GASLAND (International WOW Production & HBO Documentary Films 2010).
28 Fracking involves the injection of high volumes of water, sand, and chemicals into
deep layers of rock (usually shale) to fracture the rock, freeing up oil, gas, or other hydro-
carbons, enabling them to flow to the surface.
29 See Ion Bogdan Vasi et al., “No Fracking Way!” Documentary Film, Discursive Opportu-
nity, and Local Opposition against Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States, 2010 to 2013, 80 AM.
SOC. REV. 934 (2015) (tracing the spread of local activism and moratoria on fracking to
screenings of the film); see also Join the Movement, AMS. AGAINST FRACKING, https://
www.americansagainstfracking.org/join-the-movement/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
30 For a summary of local bans on fracking, see Local Resolutions Against Fracking, FOOD
& WATER WATCH, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/local-resolutions-against-
fracking (last updated June 12, 2019).
31 See Felicity Barringer, New Electricity Meters Stir Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/science/earth/31meters.html.
32 See Antonio Regalado, Rage Against the Smart Meter, MIT TECH. REV. (April 26, 2012),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427497/rage-against-the-smart-meter/.
33 See Chris Hooks, As Towns Say No, Signs of Rising Resistance to Smart Meters, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/us/as-texas-towns-say-no-signs-of-
rising-resistance-to-smart-meters.html.
34 See id.; see also Regalado, supra note 32.
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from the Canadian oil sands.35  Some of those same groups rallied to oppose
the Dakota Access Pipeline, partnering with environmental justice advocates
who opposed its location adjacent to land owned by the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe.36
These intense siting conflicts are not new, but they seem to be getting
common.  They often unfold within the context of siting proceedings.  This
Part describes how legal regimes that regulate energy market entry work, and
how market, political, and technological forces are changing in ways that may
influence the management of conflict within those regulatory regimes.
A. Private Investment, Public Objectives
American energy markets rely predominantly on investments of private
capital to provide energy services to the public.37  Fossil fuel production is
almost entirely managed by the private sector,38 as is most electricity produc-
tion and delivery.39  As a consequence, American energy policy uses regula-
tion to steer investment in favored directions in response to political
pressure.  In that sense, “energy policy” is the accumulated set of individual
statutes and regulations that periodically change the way the energy supply
system balances three fundamental goals: affordability, reliability, and envi-
ronmental performance.40  Prior to the late twentieth century, that balance
was usually struck in favor of reliability (energy security and resource devel-
35 See Bill McKibben, Keystone XL: Historic Moment to Resist, 350.ORG (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://350.org/nokxlpromise/ (describing 350.org’s opposition to the Keystone XL
Pipeline).
36 See Robinson Meyer, The Legal Case for Blocking the Dakota Access Pipeline, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/dapl-dakota-
sitting-rock-sioux/499178/ (discussing the pipeline’s impact on the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe).
37 See World Energy Investment 2017, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2019), https://www.iea.org/
publications/wei2017/ (last visited Oct 6, 2019).
38 See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9–11 (4th ed.
2015) (discussing the unique American practice of recognizing private ownership of natu-
ral resources).  Unlike many other countries, the United States has no national oil com-
pany, in part because it is one of the few countries in which private ownership of mineral
estates is the norm.  Consequently, coal, oil, and gas development is managed by the pri-
vate sector.  Even in situations where minerals underlie federal land, their exploitation and
production are managed by private sector lessees. Id.
39 About 75% of American electricity customers receive their service from privately
owned companies; the remainder are served either by municipal utilities or electricity
cooperatives. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY: SELECTED ISSUES, 1998, at 7 (1998), https://
www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/pdf/chg_str_issu.pdf.
40 John A. Sautter, James Landis, and Michael H. Dworkin coined the term “energy
trilemma” to describe this tension.  John A. Sautter at al., The Energy Trilemma in the Green
Mountain State: An Analysis of Vermont’s Energy Challenges and Policy Options, 10 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 477, 478 (2009).  As discussed below, economists might claim that a well-designed mar-
ket can balance these concerns if only all three attributes could be accurately priced. See
infra Section I.B.
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opment) first, and cost minimization second.41  Environmental performance
was often an afterthought, if it was considered at all.42  Thus, regulators
applied a reliability- and cost-focused public interest standard centered on a
determination of “need” for new infrastructure,43 such as power plants,44
transmission and distribution lines, pipelines,45 and liquefied natural gas
(LNG) facilities.46  The late 1960s and 1970s47 saw energy regulators broad-
ening their conception of the public interest to place more emphasis on the
41 Thus, for example, the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012), and the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a (2012), and their state analogs require that prices be
fair to consumers—“just and reasonable,” in statutory parlance. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§ 824d(a) (2012).  Regulators and courts have interpreted this requirement to imply that
managers of the electric grid should operate the grid in ways that keep the lights on first
and minimize costs second. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 5 (2006).
42 Concern about the social costs of new facilities was not entirely missing from early
public interest determinations.  In some cases, courts read the statutory language (espe-
cially the phrase “public convenience and necessity”) to include social costs. See, e.g., Kan.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 251 P. 1097, 1099 (Kan. 1927) (“The discretionary
power of the commission to grant or withhold certificates of convenience to public utility
companies is broader than its power to govern rates and services . . . .”).
43 These are typically called “certificates of need” (CON) or “certificates of public con-
venience and necessity” (CCN).  For a good summary of the long history of these public
interest/need determinations, see Ford P. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity (pts.
1 & 2), 28 MICH. L. REV. 107, 276 (1929–1930); William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870–1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426,
429–501 (1979); and Comment, A Re-Examination of Competition in Gas and Electric Utilities,
50 YALE L.J. 875, 882–84 (1941).
44 For a summary of current state CON/CCN licensing regimes for power plants, see
EDISON ELEC. INST., STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY (2013), https:/
/studylib.net/doc/18141559/directory [hereinafter EEI DIRECTORY].
45 Regarding CON/CCN licensing for transmission lines and intrastate gas pipelines,
see id.  States also regulate siting of oil pipelines—even interstate pipelines—under various
and varied state requirements.  For a summary, see Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Mein-
hardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 982–88
(2015).  Interstate natural gas pipelines must secure a CCN from the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.  15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2012).
46 Under section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
grants licenses for onshore LNG terminals using a “public interest” standard.  15 U.S.C.
§717b(a).  The statute includes a provision protecting the existing customers of the licen-
see from having to pay for terminals that do not benefit them, which is analogous to a need
determination. Id. § 717b(e)(4).
47 For a summary of post–World War II environmentalism as a legislative movement
and its spate of legislative successes in the late 1960s and 1970s, see Henry P. Caulfield, The
Conservation and Environmental Movements: An Historical Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLIT-
ICS AND POLICY 13, 13–48 (James P. Lester ed., 1989); and W. Douglas Costain & James P.
Lester, The Evolution of Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 15, 27–34
(James P. Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995).  The term “environmental decade” is often attributed to
political scientist Lettie McSpadden Wenner. See LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECADE IN COURT (1982).
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environmental consequences of energy development.48  Since that time regu-
lators have administered licensing regimes so as to approve new infrastruc-
ture only if (in their judgment) it served a need, was not too expensive, and
entailed acceptable levels of environmental harm or risk.49
Against this legal backdrop recent trends in energy markets have been
fueling demands for accelerated investment in new infrastructure.  The
restructuring of gas and electricity markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s
introduced competition and market pricing of gas and electricity—first in
wholesale markets,50 and then in (some, but not all) state retail markets.51
This transition to competitive markets triggered new investment in two ways:
first, by allowing prospective investors in new energy production facilities to
sell energy to formerly captive customers of monopoly utilities; and second,
by creating the need for new energy delivery network (pipeline and transmis-
sion line) infrastructure to accommodate those newly possible transactions.52
Some of this new investment serves reliability needs: for example, the 2014
48 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 620
(2d Cir. 1965) (positing that an agency’s public interest obligation “does not permit it to
act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it” but
rather to affirmatively protect the public on its own initiative).  This approach was later
codified in statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, mandat-
ing broad reviews of the environmental effects of agency actions.
49 To be sure, different statutory regimes strike the balance between these three con-
siderations differently, as do different decisionmakers applying the same statutory stan-
dards. See Sharon Jacobs & David Spence, Energy Tradeoffs Podcast: Environmental Privileging,
ENERGY TRADEOFFS (May 12, 2019), https://www.energytradeoffs.com/2019/05/12/
sharon_jacobs/ (discussing this issue).
50 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission completed the restructuring of whole-
sale gas markets in 1992 with the promulgation of Order 636 mandating open access to
pipelines and the unbundling of gas sales from transmission services.  Pipeline Service
Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation;
and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg.
13,267, 13,270 (Apr. 16, 1992).  It did the same for wholesale electricity sales in 1996 with
the promulgation of Order 888.  Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,591–97 (May 10, 1996).
51 Other states (predominately in the Southeast) have resisted the restructuring
impulse, retaining the traditional, vertically integrated, bundled gas and electric service
regime with regulated rates. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE, at i, ix–xi, 5-8 (2000).
52 Most experts estimate that modernizing the grid to meet new electricity market
needs will require investment in tens of thousands of miles of new transmission lines at
costs in the tens of billions of dollars. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Grid Some
Backbone, SCI. AM. EARTH 3.0, Mar. 2009, at 52, 55–57 (explaining several proposed grid
investment plans, involving tens of thousands of miles of new transmission lines costing
tens of billions of dollars); see also RICHARD W. CAPERTON & MATT KASPER, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS , RE-ENERGIZE REGIONAL ECONOMIES WITH NEW ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES 4
(2011), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/12/pdf/
transmission_lines.pdf (suggesting that the United States needs to invest at least $298 bil-
lion to upgrade the grid by 2030); PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER 89–92 (anniversary ed.
2014) (describing plans for a transmission “superhighway”).
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“polar vortex” suggested to some analysts that existing natural gas infrastruc-
ture was insufficient to provide a reliable supply of natural gas in the north-
east during cold snaps.53  Other new investment is aimed at improving
energy affordability, as when regional price differentials within the so-called
“PJM” regional electricity market54 incentivized new transmission to bring
power from low price areas in western PJM to high priced eastern PJM,55 and
construction of new generation closer to those eastern customers.56
Another driver of investment in new energy infrastructure comes from
exploding demand for renewable energy, driven by a combination of top-
down policy mandates and bottom-up market demand.  The policies include
state clean energy standards,57 tax credits,58 federal air pollution regula-
tion,59 and state or local “decarbonization” plans,60 all of which incentivize
53 See Jude Clemente, The Northeast Natural Gas Pipeline Buildout Is Coming, FORBES
(June 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2017/06/25/the-northeast-
natural-gas-pipeline-buildout-is-coming/#1b4da74d7f74.
54 PJM, which once stood for “Pennsylvania,” New “Jersey,” and “Maryland,” now cov-
ers most of the Middle Atlantic region and significant portions of the Midwest. Energy in
New Jersey: Frequently Asked Questions About Energy, ST. N.J. ENERGY MASTER PLAN, https://
www.nj.gov/emp/energy/faq.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
55 Attempts by PJM to site transmission to address this problem was the subject of two
Seventh Circuit decisions.  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019)
(overturning the cost allocation scheme for a major west-to-east transmission line); Ill.
Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (same).
56 Attempts by two eastern PJM states—New Jersey and Maryland—to incentivize the
construction of generation in their states were struck down by the Supreme Court as intru-
sions on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s exclusive authority to regulate prices
in wholesale power markets. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297
(2016); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
57 A clean energy standard, or renewable portfolio standard (RPS), requires retailers
of electric power within the state to meet their supply obligations using a specified percent-
age (or, in some cases, amount) of electricity from zero-emission or renewable sources.
These policies vary widely: each defines “clean” or “renewable energy” differently and
establishes different targets.  For up-to-date information about state RPS, see Database of
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH CTR., http://
www.dsireusa.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
58 In 1992, Congress established a production tax credit (PTC) for renewable energy
projects in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.  Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§ 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020–23 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 38–39, 45).  Con-
gress has intermittently renewed short-term tax credits for renewable energy ever since. 
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, § 187, 129
Stat. 2242, 3074 (2015); Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–295, § 155,
128 Stat. 4009, 4021; American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 407,
126 Stat. 2313, 2340–42 (2013); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat 115, 319 (extending the “Credit for Electricity Produced from
Certain Renewable Sources”).
59 The Obama EPA tightened various Clean Air Act ambient air quality standards, and
established new rules governing mercury, precursors of regional haze and ozone, and
greenhouse gas emissions.  For a summary of those rules, see David E. Adelman & David B.
Spence, Ideology vs. Interest Group Politics in U.S. Energy Policy, 95 N.C. L. REV. 339, 352–60
(2017).
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construction not only of new utility-scale wind and solar facilities, but also the
transmission lines necessary to bring their power to market.61  Indeed, the
more aggressive rapid-decarbonization plans call for construction of massive
amounts of renewable energy infrastructure—a huge nationwide system of
renewable generators connected by a national (or continental) transmission
network.62  Furthermore, now that renewables are price competitive with
traditional energy sources in many places, corporate customers are demand-
ing more clean energy.63  For example, the desire for cheap renewable
power is driving proposals to build new transmission capacity linking (1) the
windy central plains to load centers to the east—cities like Minneapolis, Chi-
cago, St. Louis and Houston—where consumers want utility-scale wind
power,64 and (2) transmission linking Texas wind power to consumers in the
southeastern Gulf Coast states.65  Regulators will determine which of these
60 For example, California’s renewable energy plan comprises a suite of laws and regu-
latory initiatives aimed at drastic reductions in carbon use. See Renewable Energy, CAL.
ENERGY COMMISSION, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
Some cities are committing to purchase of only renewable power, incentivizing additional
renewable generation on the grid. See Erica Robbie, Aspen Is Third U.S. City to Reach 100%
Renewable Energy, ASPEN TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.aspentimes.com/news/aspen-is
-third-u-s-city-to-reach-100-renewable-energy/ (reporting on both Aspen’s and Burlington’s
all-renewables policies).
61 See FOX-PENNER, supra note 52.
62 See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Low-Cost Solution to the Grid Reliability Problem with 100%
Penetration of Intermittent Wind, Water, and Solar for All Purposes, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
15060, 15060 (2015) (calling for the construction of a continental high-voltage transmis-
sion system to connect new and far flung utility-scale renewable generators).  Clack et al.
note that this plan contemplates a level of transmission and generation investment that is
fourteen times historic annual rates. See Christopher T.M. Clack et al., Evaluation of a
Proposal for Reliable Low-Cost Grid Power with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 6722, 6725 (2017).  More recently, the so-called “Green New Deal” sets ambi-
tious clean energy goals that charge the federal government with overseeing and financing
a rapid decarbonization of the economy. See David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained,
VOX (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/21/
18144138/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez.
63 See DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCS., THE GROWING DEMAND FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY
AMONG MAJOR U.S. AND GLOBAL MANUFACTURERS 3 (2017), https://www.dgardiner.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Renewable-Energy-and-Climate-Commitments-in-the-Manu
facturing-Sector_FINAL9.19.2017FINAL.pdf (describing the prevalence of clean energy
goals among major manufacturers); Julia Pyper, The Latest Trends in Corporate Renewable
Energy Procurement, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 30, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/the-latest-trends-in-corporate-renewable-energy-procurement#gs.D4MFjFs
(describing exponential growth in demand recently).
64 Perhaps the best way to visualize this agenda is to view the map of transmission
projects proposed by Clean Line Energy Partners, a merchant transmission company that
sought to connect wind farms in the central plains to cities in the East. See Diane Cardwell,
Wind Power Transmission Project in Plains Earns U.S. Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/business/energy-environment/wind-power-trans
mission-project-in-plains-earns-us-approval.html, to view that map.
65 The role of the Southern Cross Transmission Project bringing Texas wind power to
southeastern states is explained at the project web site. See Education, SOUTHERN CROSS
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proposals is built, and the next Section examines those siting regimes, and
how they are designed to work.
B. Siting Regimes, NGOs, and the Public Interest
Energy projects face regulatory barriers to entry in the form of licensing
regimes that are characteristically fragmented, both horizontally and verti-
cally, enabling conflict to continue across multiple fronts simultaneously.
Most energy projects must secure a license from an energy industry-focused
lead agency, one typically granted broad discretion to make permitting and
licensing decisions “in the public interest.”66  Sometimes the lead agency is a
federal agency, like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),67
and sometimes it is a state agency, like a state public utility commission
(PUC),68 or an oil and gas commission.69  The lead agency’s public interest
determination may include a determination of need for the project,70 or
other broad consideration of how the project might serve the goals of relia-
bility, affordability, and environmental performance.  The lead agency, then,
typically considers a wide range of costs and benefits (though in some states
that statutory mandate is narrower than others).71  Project benefits may
include enhanced energy security and/or direct and indirect economic ben-
efits, such as less expensive energy, jobs at the facility, or harder to quantify
economic benefits that flow from the availability of energy from the project.
Costs may be economic (decreased property values near the project), envi-
TRANSMISSION, https://southerncrosstransmission.com/education/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2019).
66 For a look at the history of this concept in public utility law, see Boyd, supra note 3,
at 1635–82; and sources cited supra note 43.
67 For example, FERC is the lead agency for the siting of interstate natural gas pipe-
lines and LNG terminals. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b(e), 717f(e) (2012).  For nuclear power
plants, the federal lead agency is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011–2021j.
68 State public utility commissions typically serve as lead agency for siting utility-scale
power plants (including fossil-fueled and renewable plants) and intrastate natural gas pipe-
lines and electric transmission lines. See generally EEI DIRECTORY, supra note 44.
69 State oil and gas commissions approve oil and gas production operations.  For a
summary of state oil and gas regulation, see Spence & Prentice, supra note 3, at 134–41.
70 Despite the transition to competitive electricity markets in many places, many siting
regimes for power plants retain the requirement that the regulator make a formal determi-
nation of “need” for new facilities, a requirement some now see as vestigial because the
facility will sell its output in a competitive wholesale market.  For an example of how courts
and regulators manage the awkward task of assessing the need for merchant power plants,
see Environmental Law & Policy Center v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 470 F.3d 676
(7th Cir. 2006).
71 Some version of a public interest determination is characteristic of all the siting
regimes examined here, except for oil and gas production approvals.  In many states, the
regulator makes no such determination, though in some states environmental concerns do
find their way into lead agency decisions. See Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines, PA. DEP’T
ENVTL. PROTECTION, https://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Energy/OilandGasPrograms/
OilandGasMgmt/Pages/Laws,-Regulations-and-Guidelines.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
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ronmental-related risks (threats to flora, fauna, and ecosystems), health-
related risks (increased mortality or morbidity associated with pollution from
the facility), or social justice impacts (such as a disproportionate impact on
minority communities).  The cost-benefit profiles of different kinds of energy
projects vary significantly, and are characterized by varying amounts of uncer-
tainty.  Some technologies (nuclear power, fossil-fueled power plants, trans-
mission lines) have established track records, such that we can make
reasonable estimates of their costs and risks.  Others (fracking, smart meters)
are new, and may have less well-established risk profiles.  While the law
charges regulators with addressing and balancing these concerns, the process
is typically adjudicative and adversarial, pitting project sponsors against pro-
ject opponents.  The collective outcomes of these individual siting conflicts
over time determine the overall balance the energy system strikes between
affordability, cost, and environmental performance.
Beyond the lead-agency approval, most projects must also secure one or
more issue-specific ancillary approvals from other federal, state, or local regu-
lators, in addition to the license from the lead agency.  In this split-jurisdic-
tion environment, agencies may share jurisdiction relatively efficiently or
inefficiently.  In some cases, well-established interagency coordination proce-
dures or systems of cooperative federalism72 define (more or less clearly) the
jurisdictional boundaries between agencies.  In other cases, jurisdictional
conflicts arise, triggering disputes over subject matter jurisdiction,73 federal
preemption of state law, or state preemption of local law.74  For example,
approvals of natural gas pipelines, LNG terminals, and nuclear power plants
are managed by federal lead agencies under statutory regimes that preempt
wide swaths of state and local law,75 limiting (in the first instance) the ability
72 See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 180 (2005) (defining “[c]ooperative federalism” as “an arrange-
ment under which a national government induces coordination from subordinate jurisdic-
tions”).  For a more sophisticated discussion of federalism and interagency relations, see
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 108,
122–26 (2005) (discussing the advantages of “regulatory overlap” between state and federal
environmental law); and Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 316 (2005) (“Federalism . . . achieves its goals not through the separation
of state and national power, but through their interaction.”).
73 See generally William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regu-
latory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003) (exploring the ways jurisdictional overlaps or gaps can
be exploited by firms).
74 For a discussion of federal preemption and state preemption regimes in energy law,
see David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 468–77 (2013) (summarizing federal preemption regimes for
energy production facilities); and David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93
TEX. L. REV. 351, 368–76 (2014) (focusing on state preemption of local regulation).
75 Regarding the preemptive effect of NRC licensing of nuclear power plants, see
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461
U.S. 190, 213–16 (1983) (upholding a California statute regulating waste storage because it
was “economic”—not siting—legislation, and therefore was not preempted by the Atomic
Energy Act); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1144 (8th Cir. 1971)
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of project opponents to exert leverage by enlisting support from state or local
governments.  On the other hand, these federal licensing regimes also trig-
ger ancillary environmental reviews under other federal statutes, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),76 the Coastal Zone Management
Act (CZMA),77 the Clean Water Act (CWA),78 and the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).79  These ancillary reviews not only offer opponents additional
substantive grounds on which to challenge a project, two of them—the CWA
and CZMA—vest meaningful decision-making power directly in state regula-
tors, sometimes compensating for state and local leverage lost due to federal
preemption.80
State public utility commissions typically act as lead agencies for utility-
scale power plants (fossil-fueled, wind, and solar), transmission lines, and
smart meter rollouts;81 state oil and gas agencies usually serve this role for oil
and gas production projects (including fracking operations),82 and for oil
pipelines.83  The degree to which these regimes grant leverage to local gov-
ernments varies by state.  Some states’ home rule provisions provide local
(holding that states may not enact stricter radiation emissions regulations than the federal
standards), aff’d, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604,
614 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (concluding that a city ordinance requiring an additional license for
nuclear reactors was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act); and Department of Environmen-
tal Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 344 (N.J. 1976) (declaring that
New Jersey’s environmental protection agency’s enforcement of state pollution laws against
a nuclear power plant was preempted by federal regulation).  Regarding the preemptive
effect of FERC licensing of LNG terminals, see Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC v. Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Council, 589 F.3d 458, 475 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that the
Natural Gas Act’s grant of “exclusive authority” to FERC over siting LNG facilities preempts
local siting laws).
76 NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for any
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”
including projects approved by federal agencies having significant environmental effects.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(C), 83 Stat. 852, 853
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012)).
77 The CZMA requires that federally approved activities affecting states’ costal zones
be consistent with those states’ approved coastal zone management plans. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(1) (setting forth the CZMA process for approving federal programs even when
they are inconsistent with state programs, without consent from state agencies).
78 Section 401 of the CWA instructs federal agencies considering approval of projects
that involve discharges to waterways to secure from the state in which the discharge occurs
a certification that the project will not contravene various requirements of the Clean Water
Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4).
79 Section 7 of the ESA prohibits federal agencies from approving actions that “jeop-
ardize the continued existence” of a listed endangered species.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
80 See supra notes 77–78.
81 See EEI DIRECTORY, supra note 44.
82 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
83 For a summary of state permitting regimes, see BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FED-
ERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 16 26-NOV-19 8:44
342 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
governments with de facto vetoes over transmission lines,84 wind- or solar-
farm siting,85 and oil and gas production.86  In some situations involving a
state-level lead agency, the project must also secure issue-specific approvals
under federal law, which in turn may be administered by another state agency
or a federal agency.  For example, fossil-fueled power plants must secure a
Clean Air Act (CAA) permit covering their air emissions and a CWA permit
covering their wastewater discharges.87  Thus, for example, the Sierra Club’s
campaign against coal-fired power plants includes active participation in air
permitting proceedings before state environmental agencies,88 as well as
challenges to plant licensing before state public utility commissions;89 and
local opponents sometimes use the CAA to challenge air permits for com-
pressor stations associated with natural gas pipelines.90  Similarly, when a
pipeline crosses a stream, it may trigger Army Corps of Engineers wetlands
permitting jurisdiction,91 the permit around which most of the Dakota
Access Pipeline protests centered.92  Similarly, opponents of Mojave Desert
solar farms have argued (before state agencies and in court) that the projects
will violate the ESA.93  And so on.  Table 1 summarizes the lead agency and
regulatory approvals that are most commonly triggered by the energy
projects considered here.  Shading denotes lead agency permitting regimes
that may include preemptive authority over regulation by subordinate
jurisdictions.
84 See Klass and Meinhardt, supra note 45, at 1027–53.
85 See, e.g., Jesse Heibel & Jocelyn Durkay, State Legislative Approaches to Wind Energy
Facility Siting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/energy/state-wind-energy-siting.aspx (discussing states with statewide zoning for
wind).
86 See Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, supra note 74.
87 The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) tracks the EPA’s delegation of
permitting authority under several major environmental statutes, including the Clean Air
Act and the Clean Water Act.  For a summary of this data, see SARAH GRACE LONGSWORTH
ET AL., ENVTL. COUNCIL STATES, STATE DELEGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTS (2016), https:/
/www.ecos.org/documents/state-delegations/.
88 For the Sierra Club’s own summary of their victories in this campaign, see its “Mov-
ing Beyond Coal” web page: Victories: Moving Beyond Coal, By the Numbers, SIERRA CLUB,
https://content.sierraclub.org/coal/victories (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
89 See, e.g., Take Action for a Coal Free Avista, SIERRA CLUB (Sept. 3, 2014), https://con-
tent.sierraclub.org/coal/update/3-sep-2014/take-action-free-avista.
90 See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(state challenge to air permit for pipeline compressor station).
91 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (2012).
92 See PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. INSIGHTS, IN10567, DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE: SITING CONTROVERSY (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10567.pdf.
93 In addition to the section 7 requirement applicable to federal agencies, the ESA
contains a prohibition against harming endangered species in section 9, applicable to pri-
vate sector actors. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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Fossil-Fueled Comm’n (PUC) Municipalities
CAA, CWAb
Power Plants or other siting (in some states)
agency
Wind Farms PUC or other Municipalities
(Onshore) siting agency (in some states)
Dep’t of Interior Various state
Wind Farms NEPA, CZMA,
(beyond state agencies (within
(Offshore) ESA
waters) state waters)
PUC or other Municipalities
Solar Farms ESA
siting agency (in some states)
Transmission Municipalities
PUC CWAc
Lines (in some states)
Smart Meters PUC
Oil & Gas
Oil & Gas Municipalities
Production CAA
Comm’n (in some states)
Facilities
PUC, State Oil
Oil Pipelines & Gas Comm’n, CAA, CWAb,c
or legislature
Fed. Energy









Notes: aCWA § 402 permit to discharge wastewater; bCWA § 401 water quality certification; cCWA § 404 permit
to dredge of fill wetlands
In sum, lead agency approval is typically a broad public interest inquiry,
offering regulators considerable discretion to balance competing interests
and intervenors wide latitude to raise disparate issues in opposition to (or
support for) the project.  The ancillary approvals, by contrast, tend to be
issue-specific, focused on the protection of a particular environmental value
(clean air, clean water, endangered species, etc.).  This kind of regulatory
fragmentation gives opposition groups multiple bites at the apple, and
opportunities to partner with other groups to be heard in each decision
venue, and to tailor their appeals accordingly.
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C. Centrifugal Forces in Siting
Two interrelated societal forces seem to be intensifying conflict over
energy infrastructure siting in the twenty-first century: namely, the rise of
instant digital communication coupled with the well-documented hyperpo-
larization of the American polity.  Scholars have treated the rise of digital
media and the internet alternately as a force for social integration, and a
source of fracture.  The integration argument sees digital interconnectedness
as likely to expose citizens to a broader set of views, improving civic culture
and promoting deliberative democracy.94  More recent scholarship points to
fragmented internet subcultures and homogenous opinion ecosystems that
contribute to ideological polarization among the politically active portion of
the population, in part by inoculating belief against the effects of new infor-
mation.95  These technological changes, in turn, may be both a cause and a
consequence of increasing ideological polarization of American political par-
ties, particularly over the issue of government intervention in the market
(regulation).  How might these two forces interact in the context of siting
disputes?
It seems evident that polarization increases the emotional intensity of
political conflict, in two ways.  First, as the parties’ policy agendas grow fur-
ther apart ideologically,96 each agenda appears increasing unacceptable—
even alarming—to members of the opposite party, making political victory
seem an ever more important moral imperative.  For example, increasing
numbers of conservatives equate unregulated markets (including energy
markets) with freedom and the good, see regulators as part of a dangerous
and antidemocratic “deep state,” and characterize regulation as antithetical
94 See generally KATHERINE CRAMER WALSH, TALKING ABOUT POLITICS (2004); Peter Dahl-
gren, In Search of the Talkative Public: Media, Deliberative Democracy and Civic Culture, 9
JAVNOST—PUB., no. 3, 2002, at 5; Joohan Kim et al., News, Talk, Opinion, Participation: The
Part Played by Conversation in Deliberative Democracy, 16 POL. COMM. 361 (1999); Dhavan V.
Shah et al., Information and Expression in a Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Partici-
pation, 32 COMM. RES. 531 (2005).
95 See, e.g., Michela Del Vicario et al., Mapping Social Dynamics on Facebook: The Brexit
Debate, 50 SOC. NETWORKS 6, 12 (2017) (studying the polarization between two communi-
ties and the impacts of echo chambers); Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misin-
formation Online, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 554, 558 (2016) (showing that “social
homogeneity is the primary driver of content diffusion, and one frequent result is the
formation of homogenous, polarized clusters”); Michael Schudson, Why Conversation Is Not
the Soul of Democracy, 14 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 297 (1997) (arguing that conversation
is “at the center of democratic life”); cf. DIANA C. MUTZ, IMPERSONAL INFLUENCE 24 (1998)
(balancing the roles of integration and fracture).
96 The most commonly cited database illustrating ideological polarization between the
congressional parties is the so-called “DW-NOMINATE” maintained by Keith Poole and
others. See About the Project, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/about (last visited Sept. 1,
2019). Analyses of that data indicate that the parties in Congress are further apart ideolog-
ically than at any time after World War II, and that “role of government” issues drive polari-
zation. See Jeff Lewis, Polarization in Congress, VOTEVIEW, (Aug. 14, 2019), https://voteview.
com/articles/party_polarization.
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to freedom.97  By contrast, liberals increasingly favor decarbonizing the
energy supply and view the need to rapidly “decarbonize” the economy as an
urgent moral imperative requiring swift and bold government action.98  Sec-
ond, in Congress,99 polarization begets gridlock100 much of the time, which
frustrates the policy agendas of any group seeking policy change.  Conserva-
tives have a difficult time repealing national permitting regimes that act as
barriers to energy market entry, leaving those regimes in place, while liberals
cannot legislatively regulate greenhouse gas emissions or establish national
97 Some trace the rise of this view to the funding of academic research by conservative
funders, like the Koch Brothers’ foundation. See Charles Ruger, Charles Koch Found.,
Presentation at the Private Enterprise Education Annual Meeting 2016, Session 3.F.7: Suc-
cessful Models of Programs in Private Enterprise (Apr. 5, 2016), http://static1.square
space.com/static/5400da69e4b0cb1fd47c9077/t/5720dd249f7266fe451787b4/1461771
556956/APEETRANSCRIPT3.F.7SuccessfulModelsofProgramsinPrivateEnterpriseAPEE20
16.pdf (describing the Koch Foundation strategy of funding scholars who value freedom,
and equating that with research supporting deregulation).  Others trace its origins to grow-
ing influence of Austrian economics and conservative philosophy. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (laying out the argument that social welfare is maxi-
mized by free exchange in ways we cannot know or estimate ex ante); 1 MURRAY N. ROTH-
BARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE (1962) (arguing that democratic governance is coercive,
and that social organization by bilateral bargaining maximizes welfare); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (advancing a case for a minimal state lying somewhere
between Hayek and Rothbard).
98 For a summary of the case for decarbonization, see Boyd, supra note 3, at 1632–35.
For a summary of the argument that it is an urgent moral imperative, see Roberts, supra
note 62; and Sarah Mac Donald, Bill McKibben: Pope’s Encyclical Gives Everyone ‘Marching
Orders’ on Climate, NAT’L CATH. REP. (June 30, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/
eco-catholic/bill-mckibben-pope-s-encyclical-gives-everyone-marching-orders-climate.
99 The causes of congressional polarization are disputed, but are ascribed by scholars
to a variety of factors, most of which fall within either of two categories: one focusing on
the increasing ideological homogeneity in congressional districts. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP,
THE BIG SORT 35 (2008) (discussing the “politics of place” that allow communities to
“maintain political cohesion”); JEFFREY M. STONECASH ET AL., DIVERGING PARTIES xiv (Rout-
ledge 2018) (2003) (arguing that “constituents, how they differ, and in which district they
live, matter”); Jamie L. Carson et al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of
Representative, 35 AM. POL. RES. 878, 899 (2007) (finding that “congressional districts that
have significantly changed are having an effect on levels of polarization in the House”).  A
second set of diagnoses focus on various kinds of institutional factors that affect how par-
ties manage congressional business. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Party Polarization in
American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83, 84 (2006)
(discussing the “characteristics, causes, and consequences of ideological polarization
among the parties’ leaders and elected officials”); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not
Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011) (gener-
ally exploring the different causes of polarization).
100 See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE
GRIDLOCK 40–44 (2003) (discussing polarization and the pattern of legislative gridlock).
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standards for renewable energy,101 further increasing both groups’
frustration.
These two phenomena shift focus to regulatory agencies as a focus of
conflict over laws that neither party can change.102  The presidential election
of 2016 revealed another source of centrifugal force in American politics:
namely, the ability of interested parties to shape belief, and to mislead, using
the tools of modern digital communication.103  Long before the modern
behavioral revolution,104 political philosophers and psychologists recognized
that propagandists can shape belief by playing to the cognitive biases.  James
Madison’s admonition in Federalist No. 10 that a person’s reason and passion
have “reciprocal influence” on one another is an acknowledgment that emo-
tion feeds bias.105  Henry Adams’ description of politics as the “systematic
organization of hatreds” was a more blunt and condemnatory assessment of
the manipulation of biases on American politics.106  Academic psychologists
began to chronicle the idea of biases in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury.107  What is new is the speed and effectiveness with which these biases
can now be exploited using modern communication tools.
As Russian bots and digital marketers have recently demonstrated,108
our reliance on digital communication media creates “filter bubbles” that
101 For a description of the failure of carbon regulation at the national level, see Bryan
Walsh, Why the Climate Bill Died, TIME (July 26, 2010), http://science.time.com/2010/07/
26/why-the-climate-bill-died/.
102 States are less susceptible to polarization-induced gridlock because they are less
ideologically heterogeneous.  Thus, in very “red” states, like Texas, barriers to entry and
regulatory burdens for energy facilities are low, making proponents of development happy
and opponents unhappy. See EEI DIRECTORY, supra note 44, at 117 (describing a pro forma
approval process for power plants in parts of Texas with competitive power markets).  In
very “blue” states, like California, regulatory barriers and burdens are relatively high, mak-
ing opponents of development happy and proponents unhappy. See id. at 9 (describing
the role of the California Energy Commission in power plant siting).
103 See Molly K. McKew, Did Russia Affect the 2016 Election? It’s Now Undeniable, WIRED
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/did-russia-affect-the-2016-election-its-now-
undeniable/; Gabe O’Connor & Avie Schneider, How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake
News During the 2016 Election, NPR (April 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltech-
considered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-news-dur
ing-the-2016-election.
104 For summaries of the research of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Nathan
Tversky, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); CHOICES, VAL-
UES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
106 HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 7 (Modern Library 1931) (1918).
107 For a history of the idea of confirmation bias, for example, see Raymond S. Nicker-
son, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175,
176–77 (1998).  Confirmation bias applies irrespective of the truth or falsity of the belief.
Id. at 188 (“Not only can it contribute to the perseverance of unfounded beliefs, but it can
help make beliefs for which there is legitimate evidence stronger than the evidence war-
rants.”).  Leon Festinger’s work on cognitive dissonance and rationalization dates to the
mid-twentieth century. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
108 See McKew, supra note 103.
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limit information flows and homogenize (ideologically) social networks.109
Where Americans once relied on a few sources of curated news, on the
internet they are now confronted with vast amounts of uncurated informa-
tion presented as “news.”  Human nature reacts to this not only by selecting
information sources that feed their biases; in addition, Twitter, Facebook,
and other platforms employ algorithms that amplify those biases in ways they
never see.110  In this way, digital communities accelerate the effects of confir-
mation bias,111 and feed the increasingly segmented cultural identities that
shape our politics, and our receptivity to new information about risk.112
Thus, for example, Trump loyalists and Democratic Party loyalists hold not
only different values, but also diametrically opposed beliefs about what is true
over a wide variety of subjects.113  Marketing professionals have long
exploited these biases.  Policy activists and interest groups (including envi-
ronmental NGOs) are now beginning to do so as well: that is, to employ data
analytics to take advantage of these characteristics of digital and social media
platforms, in order to better test the appeal and effectiveness of political
messages to specific audiences.114  These sophisticated message-targeting
efforts may explain why voter polarization apparently increases with voter
engagement in politics and policy debate, implying that activists can drive
polarization among the rank and file.115  Thus, digital connectedness and
polarization may feed each other, and the emotional intensity characteristic
of high-profile conflicts over proposed energy projects, including the afore-
109 ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE (2011).
110 See id.
111 See Nickerson, supra note 107, at 176–77 (discussing the history of confirmation bias
and how it has changed); see also Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, How the Web Distorts Reality
and Impairs Our Judgment Skills, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
media-network/media-network-blog/2014/may/13/internet-confirmation-bias.
112 See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 2 (1982) (“Fear of risk,
coupled with the confidence to face it, has something to do with knowledge and something
to do with the kind of people we are.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cogni-
tion and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) (proposing that individuals
have different ways of evaluating risk).
113 See Bobby Azarian, An Analysis of Trump Supporters Has Identified 5 Key Traits,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mind-in-the-
machine/201712/analysis-trump-supporters-has-identified-5-key-traits (suggesting reasons
why Trump voters accept the President’s demonstrably false statements); Lauren Griffin &
Annie Neimand, Why Each Side of the Partisan Divide Thinks the Other Is Living in an Alternate
Reality, CONVERSATION (Jan. 20, 2017), https://theconversation.com/why-each-side-of-the-
partisan-divide-thinks-the-other-is-living-in-an-alternate-reality-71458.
114 DAVID KARPF, ANALYTIC ACTIVISM 2 (2017) (noting that interest groups and policy
advocates are utilizing social media to spread their messages).
115 See Political Polarization in the American Public, Section 1: Growing Ideological Consistency,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-1-grow-
ing-ideological-consistency/#interactive; see also Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and
Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324, 324–27 (2010)
(describing how party activists play a leading role in moving party rank and file away from
the ideological middle and toward the poles—a process the authors call “conflict
extension”).
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mentioned battles over the Cape Wind project, fracking, smart meters, and
the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines.116
In order to understand how these centrifugal forces are influencing the
politics of entry into energy markets, this analysis examined closely how
NGOs oppose the siting of energy projects in the twenty-first century.
II. NGO DATA SET AND EXPECTATIONS
A. The NGO Data Set
To build the data set on which this analysis is based, research assistants at
the University of Texas assembled information about national and local
NGOs117 that actively opposed the siting of the following types of energy
projects in the twenty-first century118: oil and gas production operations, liq-
uefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, oil and gas pipelines, fossil-fueled power
plants, electric transmission lines, wind farms (onshore and offshore), solar
farms (photovoltaic and concentrated solar), nuclear power plants, and
smart meters.119  The energy project types were selected because new project
proposals of these types are or were, during the study period, sufficiently
numerous or common to provoke consistent local opposition.120  For each
project type, research assistants assembled two data sets: one consisting of
information about NGOs opposing proposed projects of that type, and
another consisting of information about the proposed projects the NGOs
opposed.
116 See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
117 In fact, the data set includes NGOs that claim international reach, national reach,
and multistate/regional reach, all of which we classified under the label “national” on the
grounds that they were not organized around opposition to a specific project or protection
of a single environmental resource.  Local and state NGOs, whose mission is to fight a
specific local project or projects, or to protect a specific local resource, were classified as
“local” in this analysis.
118 More precisely, the study period comprises the years 2000–2017, when data gather-
ing ended.  That is, researchers attempted to identify all NGOs that were active opponents
of one of the energy project types during the study period.  Some of the NGOs in the data
set are now defunct, the projects they opposed having been built or canceled.  Most con-
tinue to exist in some form.
119 For purposes of this analysis, defining NGO opposition to a particular “energy pro-
ject” was relatively straightforward in all but two of our project categories.  For oil and gas
development and smart meters, respectively, it would be impractical to treat each smart
meter or each oil or gas well as an individual project; nor did NGOs opposing those devel-
opments treat them that way.  Rather, in those cases we defined “projects” to be the intro-
duction of oil and gas production or smart meters to a particular geographic area.  Thus,
the roll out of smart meters by Pacific Gas & Electric in Marin County, California, was
treated as a single project.  Similarly, the introduction of fracking to Tioga County, Penn-
sylvania, was treated as a single project.
120 Thus, for example, hydroelectric projects and new offshore oil projects were
excluded from this analysis because very few new projects in these categories have gone
through siting processes in the twenty-first century.
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Both data sets were assembled initially using web-available information
(culled from NGO web sites and Facebook pages), supplemented by searches
of legal (both administrative and judicial) and registered lobbyist databases.
For the NGO data set, researchers’ initial task was to identify NGOs whose
missions included some form of organized opposition to our sample project
types during the study period.  This suggests a few important caveats when
working with the data.  First, the data set does not necessarily reflect the dis-
tribution of public opinion about energy projects.  It excludes groups organ-
ized to support energy projects, including so-called “astroturf” groups121
created to lobby on behalf of their projects.122  Second, the data may also
understate the number of opposition NGOs that existed during the study
period, because data gathering took place during the 2016 and 2017 period.
Therefore, it is possible that researchers could have missed information
about NGOs that opposed energy projects within our study period if the
NGO disbanded, and left no online record of its presence prior to 2016, and
never participated in legal proceedings.123
Third, the data may be unrepresentative of public opinion because some
interests never form groups.  If political activity is the sum of the various vec-
tors of interest group pressure,124 that underrepresentation could act as a
121 Astroturf groups are styled as grassroots citizens groups but are in fact organized
and/or funded by pro-development interests.  The label “astroturf” is intended to denote
fake grassroots organizations. Astroturfing, TAEGAN GODDARD’S POL. DICTIONARY, http://
politicaldictionary.com/words/astroturf/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
122 Because energy technologies compete with one another in the market, we also con-
sidered the possibility that NGOs in our data set might be funded by competitors.  There
have been news reports of Koch Brothers funding antiwind organizations, and Russian and
Saudi funding of antifracking activism. See John Carney, Matt Damon’s Anti-Fracking Film
Backed by OPEC Member, CNBC (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/id/49218229;
Keith Harrington, Koch Brothers Declare War on Offshore Wind, GRIST (July 16, 2011), http://
grist.org/wind-power/2011-07-14-koch-brothers-declare-war-on-offshore-wind/; Matthew
Sheffield, Is Putin Funding Anti-Fracking Groups? Republicans Think so—and So Did Hillary
Clinton, SALON (July 16, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/07/16/is-putin-funding-anti-
fracking-groups-republicans-think-so-and-so-did-hillary-clinton/.  We found no evidence of
such industry funding of NGOs in our sample, but recognize that it could be a driver of
opposition in some cases.
123 For example, it is conceivable that once-active local antifracking NGOs in New York
disbanded after the state banned fracking statewide in 2013.  Similarly, if a particular NGO
opposing a specific project removed its web presence before 2016 after stopping a project
or failing to stop it, that NGO may be omitted from this data set.  Or, as NGOs evolve and
change names and missions, it is possible that researchers could have missed information
about earlier NGO incarnations and their activities.  Finally, the project data sets were built
initially from the NGO data set; until researchers complete supplemental work to fill out
the project data sets, it is possible that the data sets omit noncontroversial projects (those
that attracted no NGO opposition) but are otherwise within our selected technologies and
date range.
124 This view of the policy process was known as “pluralism theory” within the political
science literature. See, e.g., DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 45–47, 505
(Greenwood Press 1981) (1951) (explaining policy as the product of interest group
pressure).
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probusiness bias in the siting process.125  On the other hand, scholars chal-
lenge some elements of the business dominance hypothesis, suggesting that
for high-salience issues the policy process tends to be much more
majoritarian,126 even when the majority view contradicts the preferences of
business.127  That is, even if new NGOs do not form, politicians or extant
NGOs may represent otherwise latent interests, even mobilizing those mass
interests in their absence.128  Indeed, some scholars explain social movement
NGOs as a reaction to the exclusion of a group or interest from the domi-
nant power structure, partly contradicting the hypothesis that mass interests
are systematically underrepresented by interest groups.129  In any case, for all
125 Both the sociological and economic wings of political science embraced this busi-
ness dominance hypothesis in the 1950s and 1960s.  Among the political sociologists, see,
for example, CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 171 (1977) (chronicling busi-
ness’ resource advantages over other interest groups in the policy process); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 34–35 (1960) (“The flaw in the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”).  Among politi-
cal economists, see, for example, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
141–48 (2d ed. 1971) (explaining probusiness bias in the policy process as the product of
individual incentives for (or against) interest group formation).
126 Much of the history of American regulation has been one of “republican
moments”—instances in which the broad interest in a problem has overcome powerful,
organized interests to produce national legislative victories.  This terminology comes from
James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Consti-
tutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 310–13 (1990).  For applications of this idea to envi-
ronmental and other forms of regulation, see Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—
the “Issue-Attention” Cycle, 28 PUB. INT. 38, 39–41, 43–44 (1972) (explaining the “issue atten-
tion cycle” and its application to environmental concerns); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992) (applying this idea to
environmental law); David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL.
L. REV. 397, 436 (2002) (discussing “republican moments” and major regulatory
legislation).
127 See KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING 14 (1998) (finding that direct lobbying in the
face of public opinion opposition has little effect); MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND
POLITICAL POWER 13 (2000) (finding that when business interests are united in actively
supporting a policy proposal the Congress is less likely to accede to their wishes); Benjamin
I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion? 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 37 (1987) (explaining
how business lobbying via media advocacy more often has counterproductive effects).
Interestingly, our database demonstrates that local opposition groups do form frequently.
Despite that fact, to oppose new energy projects, a recent survey of public attitudes toward
fourteen energy projects found that proximity to proposed projects was not associated with
an increase in opposition to the project.  David M. Konisky et al., Examining the Role of
NIMBYism in Public Acceptance of Energy Infrastructure (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
128 See Pope, supra note 126, at 310–11.
129 See Michael Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1144, 1144
(1968) (attributing protest to systematic power biases against the protesting population);
see also Peter K. Eisinger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities, 67 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 11, 18 (1973) (making the same point); William A. Gamson, Stable Unrepresentation in
American Society, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Nov.–Dec. 1968, at 15, 18–20 (mobilization is trig-
gered by exclusion from the power structure).
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these reasons our numerical count of NGOs should not be taken as necessa-
rily representative of public opinion toward the energy projects in question.
Finally, in the project data set the term “project” means a proposal to
build a particular facility of a given type, such as a power plant (for example,
the Cape Wind project) or pipeline (such as the Dakota Access Pipeline).
Researchers did not produce a “project” list for oil and gas operations (frack-
ing) or for smart meters, since opposition to those technologies focused not
on individual installations but on the introduction of these technologies to a
particular geographic—for example, the introduction of smart meter tech-
nology into Marin County, California, or the introduction of fracking to the
town of Denton, Texas.  Also, for certain project types, particularly transmis-
sion lines and pipelines, only major projects were considered.130
These caveats aside, the data set is intended to provide a snapshot of the
set of organized NGOs that form to oppose energy projects.  Table 2 summa-
rizes basic characteristics of the data set.  The data comprise more than four
hundred NGOs and more than two hundred projects.
TABLE 2:  NGOS AND PROJECTS IN DATA SET, 2000–17
No. of International No. of State or
Facility Type No. of Projects




Pipelines 30 49 39




Transmission lines 16 49 64
Wind Farms 16 66 53
Solar Farms 8 38 42
Nuclear power plants 9 17 18
Smart Meters 3 17 N/A
Clearly, some technologies incited more organized group opposition
than others during the study period.  We might hypothesize that the raw
numbers in Table 2 ought to reflect some combination of the scale of the
industry (number of projects) and the strength of public antipathy to the
industry.  The first four rows of the table reflect the strength of public
opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure, and the increasingly organized
national effort over the study period to restrict its growth.  And the large
number of groups formed to oppose fracking is likely a function of the
hundreds of communities into which the industry ventured during the study
period and the strength of public concern about the industry.  By the same
130 Major transmission projects were defined according to length and voltage; major
pipelines were defined according to their interstate nature and volume.
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token, it is apparent from the table that other types of energy projects attract
significant amounts of NGO opposition as well; wind farms and transmission
lines, for example, triggered as much opposition by this measure as several of
the fossil fuel project types.
B. Organizing the Data: The Logic of Opposition
1. Tactical Choices
NGOs opposing these energy projects have a menu of possible tactical
approaches to choose from, including both inside strategies (such as direct
participation in the siting proceeding, or hiring a lobbyist) and outside strat-
egies (such as mobilizing others to pressure decisionmakers).  Researchers
organized NGO tactical choice data into four categories: (1) legal intervention
(litigation) to challenge siting decisions made by regulators, including both
formal intervention as a party to administrative siting proceedings and judi-
cial challenges to siting decisions; (2) political mobilization, including both for-
mal lobbying of government decisionmakers and campaigns to mobilize the
public to comment on the record in agency proceedings; (3) direct protest,
such as marches and sit-ins; and (4) boycotts or other economic pressure.
Hypotheses H1–H3 reflect expectations derived from prior research about
how NGOs’ tactical choices may be influenced by NGO-specific variables, and
energy-project-type variables.
H1: Play to your strengths.  National NGOs will tend to employ tactics consis-
tent with their resource strengths (expertise-lobbying, litigation science,
etc.), while local NGOs seek “whatever works.”
National NGOs’ tactical choices ought to be more fixed or immutable
than those of local NGOs.  National NGOs’ tactical choices reflect more fun-
damental and considered strategic choices about the best way to realize insti-
tutional goals, and the resource allocation and staffing decisions that result
from those choices.  We might expect local groups, by contrast, to take a
more instrumental or ad hoc approach to tactics, particularly if they formed
in response to local concern over a specific energy project proposal.131  Local
groups might also face more severe resource constraints than national NGOs;
they may lack the resources to formally litigate or lobby decisionmakers
directly, and may be relegated to grassroots methods: protests, showing up at
public hearings, and information dissemination campaigns intended to build
support for their cause.  Furthermore, the local costs of a particular project
may not loom as large to state and national regulators as they do to locals.
131 The Natural Resources Defense Council is more likely to use litigation, and Green-
peace is more likely to organize direct protests and boycotts, than most other national
environmental groups.  Indeed, NRDC describes itself as the “first litigation-focused” envi-
ronmental NGO. Litigation, NRDC, https://www.nrdc.org/about/litigation (last visited
Sept. 9, 2019).  Similarly, Greenpeace describes itself as an organization that employs pro-
tests to achieve its aims. About, GREENPEACE, https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/about/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
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This might steer local NGOs toward building and mobilizing a more numer-
ous and geographically broader set of allies so as to sway state or national
regulators.
H2: Horizontal and vertical interconnectedness.  In a digitally connected world,
NGOs’ tactical choices will be influenced by successful tactics that other
groups employ, or by assistance, coordination, and direction offered by
national NGOs.
Digital connectedness facilitates vertical and horizontal relationships
between NGOs that evolve from overlapping social movements that change
over time.132  Local groups may partner with other local groups, or seek assis-
tance from national environmental groups; or national groups may bear the
cost of organizing local opposition in order to further some national objec-
tive.  For example, both National Wind Watch133 and the Natural Resources
Defense Council provide assistance to local groups that oppose wind farms
and fracking, respectively.134  While the heterogeneity of the environmental
movement makes these sorts of collaborations delicate,135 we nevertheless
expect intergroup relationships to influence NGOs’ tactical choices.
H3: NGOs tailor tactics to the regulatory decision environment.  NGOs’ tactical
decisions are influenced by their estimate of the likelihood of success under
the particular siting regime.
The regulatory decision environment can also push NGOs toward partic-
ular tactical and issue choices.  If NGOs mobilize based upon expected value
132 See Doug McAdam & Hilary Schaffer Boudet, Putting Social Movements in Their
Place 177–78 (2012) (exploring intergroup coordination in opposition to LNG import
terminals).  In the literature on “social movements,” that term subsumes not only local
groups opposing particular land uses but also much broader social and political “-isms” like
consumerism, environmentalism, and fascism, and seeks to understand why these social
phenomena (movements) arise in some social, economic, and political contexts (geo-
graphically and over time), and not others.
133 National Wind Watch’s web site offers a variety of technical and non-technical publi-
cations to provide support in opposition to what it calls “industrial wind” installations.
NAT’L WIND WATCH, https://www.wind-watch.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
134 See Alexandra Zissu, How to Tackle Fracking in Your Community, NRDC (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/how-tackle-fracking-your-community.
135 For example, in opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline, the Sioux Tribe’s objections
were based on environmental justice concerns, not on broader opposition to pipelines or
fossil fuels, despite the widespread support it received from anti-fossil-fuel groups.  Nathan
Rott & Eyder Peralta, In Victory for Protestors, Army Halts Construction of Dakota Pipeline, NPR
(Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/04/504354503/army-
corps-denies-easement-for-dakota-access-pipeline-says-tribal-organization; see also Andrew J.
Hoffman & Stephanie Bertels, Who is Part of the Environmental Movement?, in GOOD COP/
BAD COP 48, 61–62 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010) (drawing distinctions between  “bright
green[ ]” groups that collaborate with business, and “dark green[ ]” groups that do not);
Mark Van Putten, Foreword: What Do Environmental Groups Want?, in GOOD COP/BAD COP,
supra, at xv, xvi–xviii (exploring differences between decentralized national membership
organizations with local chapters, like Sierra Club or National Wildlife Foundation, and
more centralized “grasstops” organizations like Natural Resources Defense Council and
Environmental Defense Fund, that rely on a few large donors).
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calculations, they ought to be influenced by their perception of the degree to
which the decision process is stacked for or against them.  If meaningful par-
ticipation in the siting process requires technical expertise (as with nuclear
licensing, for example) the NGO lacks, it may opt out of direct participation
in favor of protests or boycotts.  If the agency’s primary historical mission is
to ensure a reliable energy supply (such as a state oil and gas agency or pub-
lic utility commission), an environmental NGO may eschew formal interven-
tion in the siting proceeding (or judicial review of the agency decision) as
futile; by contrast, the same NGO may perceive a greater likelihood of suc-
cess participating in an ancillary environmental permitting proceeding for
the same project, since the regulator’s statutory mission makes it more recep-
tive to the NGO’s arguments.136
2. Issue Choices
Researchers grouped the arguments NGOs raise in opposition to energy
projects into four categories: (1) risks to human health; (2) nonhealth risks to
the environment; (3) economic arguments (reduced property values or other
economic costs); and (4) environmental justice arguments.137  Hypotheses
H4–H7 reflect expectations derived from prior research about how NGOs’
issue choices will vary across energy project-types and siting regimes.
H4a: Health risk arguments ought to track actual risks.  NGO issue arguments
about health and environmental risks ought to track the actual risks of the
project they oppose.
H4b (alternate): Health risk arguments ought to track perceived risks.  NGO issue
arguments about health and environmental risks ought to track the per-
ceived risks of the project they oppose.
Some project types in the data set entail more risks to health than
others.  Coal-fired power plant emissions kill tens of thousands of Americans
prematurely each year.138  Natural-gas-fired power plants emit greenhouse
gases, but produce a small fraction of coal’s health risks.139  Wind and solar
136 There is a well-established literature that examines these delegation decisions, and
hypothesizes that elected officials choose delegates strategically in this way. See, e.g., David
Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38
AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 698 (1994); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureau-
cratic Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 91, 96–97; Jonathan R. Macey,
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93,
94, 99–108 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug
of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 672–73 (1992).  For example, in energy
permitting the Texas and Oklahoma legislatures delegated oil and gas permitting to an oil
and gas commission; in New York and Pennsylvania, the legislatures delegated permitting
to the state environmental agency.
137 Safety concerns were grouped in the “risks to human health” category.
138 See Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 91 (2011) (assessing the costs associated with coal production in the
hundreds of billions, much of it associated with premature deaths).
139 See, e.g., Lu Chen et al., Comparative Human Toxicity Impact of Electricity Produced from
Shale Gas and Coal, 51 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 13018, 13025 (2017) (documenting disparate
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power have no emissions, and pose almost no risk to human health at the
power generation stage.140  We should expect, then, that the projects that
produce the largest risks to human health will generate most opposition
framed around risks to human health.  In that case, we might imagine a hier-
archy in which coal-fired power plants and oil and gas operations invite the
most risk-based opposition, and renewable power stations, transmission lines,
and smart meters trigger the least amount of risk-based opposition.
On the other hand, we also know from the large literature on risk regu-
lation that popular perceptions of risk deviate from quantifiable risks in sys-
tematic ways, and that the latter can drive opposition to unwanted land
uses.141  Paul Slovic’s psychometric paradigm predicts that inaccurate risk
estimates will be a function of the magnitude of the risk in question (undis-
counted by its probability) combined with its unfamiliarity,142 and he cites
nuclear power plants as an example of a technology whose perceived risks
greatly exceed its actual risks to human health.143  Similarly, one of the early
heuristics identified by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky was humans’
impacts from discharges of toxics over the life cycle of coal and natural gas for use as
electricity fuels); Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United
States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1667–69 (2011) (estimating the mortality and
morbidity harm associated with coal combustion at more than fifty times that of natural gas
combustion).
140 Solar power entails significant externalities upstream of the power generation stage.
Mining silicon or other minerals used in photovoltaic cells presents inhalation and other
hazards to miners and neighbors, similar to other mining operations.  The production of
PV cells uses hazardous chemicals and produces hazardous wastes. See SILICON VALLEY
TOXICS COAL., TOWARD A JUST AND SUSTAINABLE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 25–26 (2009),
http://svtc.org/wp-content/uploads/Silicon_Valley_Toxics_Coalition_-_Toward_a_Just_
and_Sust.pdf (summarizing these externalities).  However, much of the upstream supply
chain for solar cells and panels occurs outside the United States.
141 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESS-
MENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OVERVIEW REPORT, at xix–xx (1987) (detailing the gap
between expert and lay assessments of environmental risks); Chauncey Starr, Introductory
Remarks, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2, 2–3 (Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr.,
eds., 1980) (describing public misperceptions of risk); Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick,
On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 11, 12 (1981).
142 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281–83 (1987); Paul Slovic et al.,
Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 141, at
181, 181–98 (Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr., eds., 1980) (describing public
misperceptions of risk).
143 Slovic, supra note 142, at 281, 284–85; see also Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the
Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 104, at 288
(describing the problem of loss aversion); Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage
Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 657 (1961) (describing the problem of ambiguity aversion).
Subsequent analyses have supported this view. MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR
POWER 9–10 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/; see also JOHN M. DEUTCH ET AL.,
MASS. INST. TECH., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 8 (2009) (docu-
menting a “risk premium” paid by nuclear power owing to the discrepancy between actual
and perceived risk).
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heightened sensitivity to the risk of loss,144 and loss aversion can be triggered
whenever a new (perceived) risk is introduced to the neighborhood in the
form of a proposed energy project.  All of which suggests an alternative
hypothesis: namely, that risk-based appeals will be more commonly made in
opposition to projects for which the perceived risks to human health are great-
est, such as LNG facilities (fears of tanker explosions) or nuclear power
plants (fears of meltdowns).
As a caveat to H4b, however, we might expect national NGOs to be less
likely than local NGOs to appeal to misperception of risk.  As repeat players
in siting conflicts and larger policy debates, national NGOs may be less likely
to embrace risk-based arguments that lack a scientific basis, for fear of losing
credibility in subsequent contests over energy projects.  Local groups aiming
to stop a single project may be more willing to do so if those arguments
resonate with voters.
H5: Environmental risk arguments ought to be more broadly distributed across project
types.
Virtually every project type in the data set has some sort of environmen-
tal impact.  Power plants and LNG facilities with wastewater discharges can
disrupt fisheries or broader aquatic ecosystems; and downwind deposition of
their air emissions can harm animal habitats and fresh water systems.  Wind
farms, power lines, and concentrated solar farms pose a risk to birds, for
example.145  Because of their large lateral footprint and desert location, solar
farms may also disrupt ground species’ habitats.146  It is safe to say that NGOs
opposing every project type in the data set (with the possible exception of
smart meters) ought to be able to raise some sort of argument based on the
actual risk the project poses to nonhealth environmental values.
H6: Environmental justice arguments may track the proximity of projects to disadvan-
taged and minority communities.
Extensive prior scholarship suggests that energy facilities tend to be sited
in disadvantaged communities.147  However, depending upon why that is, we
144 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341, 342 (1984) (illustrating individuals’ stronger preference for avoiding losses than for
realizing equivalent gains).  This  result may be an artifact of the need for early humans to
preserve gains and to be vigilant against threats to those gains.
145 Concentrated solar power stations kill birds that fly into the path of the solar energy
diverted by mirrors to the generating unit. See Morgan Walton, Note, A Lesson from Icarus:
How the Mandate for Rapid Solar Development Has Singed a Few Feathers, 40 VT. L. REV. 131, 132
(2015).
146 Id. at 137.
147 ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, at xiv (1990) (chronicling the disparate
impact on poor, black communities of hazardous waste facility siting in the South).  The
scholarly literature lagged the environmental justice movement on the ground, which
many trace to a dispute over hazardous waste disposal in Warren Country, North Carolina,
in 1983, or to a 1987 report by the United Church of Christ identifying the racial dispari-
ties in exposure to toxic chemicals. See DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES 19 (2014)
(describing the two reports and the history surrounding them).
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may or may not see environmental justice arguments raised in our data.  Dif-
ferent strains of the literature attribute this disparity to (a) conscious or
unconscious racist motives, reflected in actions like zoning choices made by
government,148 (b) a poverty bias in the regulatory siting process, where land
values in poor neighborhoods are correlated with race,149 or (c) the relative
inability of minority and poor communities to mount effective political and
legal opposition, since political activity levels tend also to be correlated with
race and poverty.150  This last explanation suggests that disadvantaged com-
munities may be underrepresented by NGOs, and unrepresented in siting
processes for energy facilities.  Nevertheless, for NGOs opposing projects in
disadvantaged communities, environmental justice arguments can be a lever
in litigation as well as a tool of mobilization.151
H7: NGOs tailor issue choices to the regulatory decision environment.
Finally, as with tactical choices, there are reasons to expect systematic
differences between the risk-based arguments embraced by national versus
local groups.  In the context of siting regimes governed by a broad “public
interest” decision criterion (like certificate of need proceedings), any and all
148 E.g., TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 147–91; Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros:
Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998).
149 Tracy Yandle & Dudley Burton, Reexamining Environmental Justice: A Statistical Analy-
sis of Historical Hazardous Waste Landfill Siting Patterns in Metropolitan Texas, 77 SOC. SCI. Q.
477, 488–89 (1996) (finding correlations for poverty but not racial minorities at the time
of siting); see also Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demographics of
Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229, 243 (1994); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nui-
sance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOL-
OGY L. Q. 1, 33–34 (1997) (reaching similar conclusions); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental
Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1996).
150 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 81–82 (describing minority communities as a
“path of least resistance” for project proponents); James T. Hamilton, Testing for Environ-
mental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political Power?, 14 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 107, 110
(1995); Yandle & Burton, supra note 149, at 490 (finding that increasing percentages of
racial minorities in the neighborhood in the years after facility siting); Been & Gupta,
supra note 149, at 33 (reaching the same conclusion); see also Kishore Gawande & Hank
Jenkins-Smith, Nuclear Waste Transport and Residential Property Values: Estimating the Effects of
Perceived Risks, 42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 207, 209 (2001).
151 A Clinton administration executive order mandated that agency environmental
reviews include analyses of the particular impacts of proposed actions on minority commu-
nities.  Exec. Order 12,898, § 1-102(b), 3 C.F.R. 859, 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).  This may offer NGOs representing poor or minority communities
another basis for opposition to energy projects, and we might therefore expect to see envi-
ronmental justice arguments raised more often by groups using litigation; on the other
hand, many scholars reviewing these environmental justice reviews conclude that they
exert relatively little effect on outcomes. See Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental
Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992,
10,992 (2000); Uma Outka, Comment, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57
ME. L. REV. 209, 258 (2005).  During the Obama administration, the EPA tried to reinvigo-
rate environmental justice analysis, but that effort will undoubtedly be met with little
enthusiasm by the Trump administration.
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issue arguments might resonate with decisionmakers.  These would include
(a) when the introduction of a new power plant or power line near a residen-
tial neighborhood, which might reduce residential property values, (b) when
the issuance of a license confers the power of eminent domain upon the
licensee (as with natural gas pipelines and transmission lines),152 or (c) when
the new energy project will be paid for by ratepayers through regulated rates.
By contrast, we might expect NGOs to employ narrower issue arguments in
the context of ancillary approvals governed by narrower statutory criteria,
such as water quality certificates issued under the Clean Water Act.153
III. RESULTS: POPULAR MOBILIZATION, RISK, AND DIGITAL CONNECTEDNESS
Tables A-1 and A-2 (in Appendix A) summarize the NGO data.  A com-
plete analysis of all the trends in the data is beyond the scope of this paper,
but they do illuminate several of the issues discussed in Part III.  Specifically,
three patterns in the data seem consistent with the notion that polarization
and interconnectedness make twenty-first-century siting conflicts frequent
and intense.  First, the NGOs in our data set rely most heavily on mass mobili-
zation efforts built around risk-based arguments (H1, H4, and H5); this
holds true irrespective of project type.  The tactics and issue arguments con-
templated by regulatory regimes—administrative or judicial litigation around
the definition of the public interest or lobbying to change the law—are far
less frequently used than risk-based, mass appeals.  Second, a closer look at
NGOs’ health-risk-based appeals shows that local NGOs (but not national
NGOs) often mobilize support around health risk appeals unsupported by
the scientific literature (hypothesis H4b), thereby feeding misperceptions of
risk.  Third, there is evidence in the data of digital interconnectedness of
NGOs, particularly in the tactical similarity between national and local
groups’ opposition to fossil fuel projects, but elsewhere as well.  This may
reflect the increased effectiveness of public influence strategies in an era of
easy both horizontal and vertical communication between groups (H1 and
H2).  This Part elaborates on each of these three patterns, in turn, and
explores their broader implications.
A. Mass Mobilization Around Risk
Table A-1 indicates that NGOs routinely seek to mobilize mass publics to
political action in opposition to energy projects; indeed, it is the only tool of
opposition employed by majorities of NGOs in every project category.154
152 Indeed, NGOs have begun to challenge the use of eminent domain power by licen-
sees on Fifth Amendment takings grounds, arguing that private investment in energy infra-
structure is not a “public use.”  For a discussion of this argument, see James W. Coleman,
Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure,
2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 167.
153 For a discussion of these proceedings, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
154 Researchers did not code the NGO as “mobilizing political opposition” from the
mere existence of a website with an opposition slant.  Almost all the NGOs in our database
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NGOs regularly urge voters to submit on-the-record comments to regulatory
agencies and legislators, to show up at public hearings, and the like.  A typical
NGO appeal stresses the need for decisionmakers to hear the concerns of
NGO members and provides advice about how to submit letters or emails to
decisionmakers.  Unsurprisingly, we found that this form of mobilization is
most common when decisions are pending before lead agencies like state
PUCs and the FERC; it is less common for ancillary environmental approvals,
other than state Clean Water Act section 401 certifications required for pipe-
lines.155  NGOs mobilized the public not only to persuade regulators, but
also when elected officials considered changing the law in ways that might
affect the probability that a project would move forward.  This happened dur-
ing the study period most often in connection with fracking regulation, when
state legislatures intervened to either preempt or protect local bans on oil
and gas production: two states legislatively preempted local fracking bans,
forcing fracking on local governments that opposed it,156 and two states
imposed statewide bans, thereby preventing fracking in local communities
that wanted it.157  Several NGOs (particularly in Texas) urged opponents of
provided information to people about the projects they opposed.  Only if they urged on
the record participation in siting regimes were they coded as mobilizers of such action.
155 In the wake of the movements to oppose the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipe-
lines, NGO oppositions to pipelines have now become more systematic and organized, and
include appeals to urge states to deny these Clean Water Act approvals.  In New York State,
where fracking is very unpopular, pipelines are described as carrying “fracked gas,” and the
regulators have begun to deny 401 certificates to pipelines. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas
Berkman, Deputy Comm’r & Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, to
Georgia Carter, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Millenium Pipeline Co., and John Zim-
mer, Pipeline/LNG Mkt. Dir., TRC Environmental Corp. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.
dec.ny.gov/docs/permits_ej_operations_pdf/valleydecltr.pdf (denying 401 certification
for the joint Valley Lateral Project); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909
F.3d 635, 645, 654 (4th Cir. 2018) (overturning the Corps decision to allow pipeline con-
struction to proceed under a Clean Water Act section 401 nationwide permit, and requir-
ing that the project secure an individual 401 permit from the Corps).
156 In 2015, Texas and Oklahoma each amended their oil and gas statutes to preempt
local bans on fracking, after the City of Denton, Texas, had banned the industry by refer-
endum. See Emily Atkin, Fracking Bans are No Longer Allowed in Oklahoma, THINK PROGRESS
(June 1, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/fracking-bans-are-no-longer-allowed-in-
oklahoma-6bae827748a0/; Wade Goodwyn, New Texas Law Makes Local Fracking Bans Illegal,
NPR (May 20, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/05/20/408156948/new-texas-law-makes-
local-fracking-bans-illegal.
157 This is despite the fact that many of the types of energy projects in our database
could be stopped by elected politicians.  The Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines
engaged Presidents Obama and Trump, who took responsibility for their respective
approvals and disapprovals of these lines.  In 2013, New York imposed an indefinite mora-
torium on fracking, after several municipalities in the southern tier of the state had passed
ordinances welcoming the industry. See Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans
Fracking in New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/
18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-in-new-york-state-citing-health-risks.html.  Maryland
imposed its statewide ban in 2017.  Jon Hurdle, With Governor’s Signature, Maryland Becomes
Third State to Ban Fracking, STATEIMPACT PA. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/
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fracking to contact their state legislators while these decisions were pending.
Despite the force of these kinds of legislative interventions, very little of this
political action we observed consisted of formal, direct lobbying of legisla-
tors.158  Formal lobbying is relatively expensive, which may account for its
sparse use; by contrast, mass mobilization is more inexpensive than ever in
the digital age.159
Table A-2 reveals that much of this political action was built around risk-
based messages.  NGOs were more likely to feature health and environmental
risk-based claims than claims about the economic or environmental justice
impacts of energy projects.  This generalization holds across all project types
for environmental risks, and across all but three project types for health
risks.160  Much of the health risk messaging fit expectations.  For example,
coal-fired power plants present the largest risks to human health among our
project types161 by a considerable margin, and virtually every NGO opposing
coal-fired power plants mobilized political action around issues like the
direct health impacts of conventional air pollutant emissions (on mortal-
ity),162 the effects of emissions on climate,163 and the effects of emissions on
pennsylvania/2017/04/04/with-governors-signature-maryland-becomes-third-state-to-ban-
fracking/.
158 The federal government and a sizeable minority of states require lobbyists to regis-
ter.  A search of those databases revealed that only eleven of the more than four hundred
NGOs in our database were, or had hired, registered lobbyists.
159 Our data may understate the amount of direct lobbying that occurs in two ways.
First, some states do not require lobbyists to register, meaning that direct lobbying of state
legislators may occur there in ways we did not detect.  Second, in project categories in
which local government action can stop or slow a project, direct lobbying of local govern-
ment officials may happen in ways we did not detect.  This would be true under state
permitting regimes that specifically grant vetoes to local governments—some state siting
regimes for pipelines and transmission lines, and regulation of fracking in some states.
Moreover, lobbying may be the province of national groups like Sierra Club because they
pursue a long-term, broad national policy agenda.  These groups have both the expertise
and staff to lobby formally.  The Sierra Club is a registered federal lobbying organization,
and spent several hundred thousand dollars lobbying Congress in 2016. See Sierra Club,
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000259&year=
2016 (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting the Sierra Club’s lobbying activity and spend-
ing in 2016).
160 Health risk arguments were more common than the non-risk-issue categories in
every project category except solar power and transmission projects, where economic
impact arguments were slightly more common than health risk claims.
161 See Muller et al., supra note 139, at 1669–70; see also Epstein et al., supra note 138.
162 See, e.g., Indiana Survey: Hoosiers Would Pull Plug on Duke Energy’s Proposed Coal-Fired
Power Plant in Edwardsport, CITIZENS ACTION COAL. (Apr. 22, 2008), https://www.citact.org/
indiana-survey-hoosiers-would-pull-plug-duke-energys-proposed-coal-fired-power-plant-
edwardsport (“Four out of five Indiana residents . . . are concerned about the possible ill
health effects—including asthma, heart problems and mental retardation in children—
that could be experienced by you, your family members and others as the result of
increased pollution from a new coal-fired power plant in Indiana.”).
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ecosystems.164  Fracking engenders more dread than risk,165 but it too pro-
duces significant externalities, and most of the groups that mobilized opposi-
tion did so around health and environmental risks: many concerned air and
water contamination, but also seismicity and other impacts.166  Similarly,
NGOs opposing pipelines raised concerns about water pollution risks, such
as pipeline leaks at river crossings; this also comports with the tactical choice
to challenge Clean Water Act approvals for pipelines.167
The predominance of environmental risk arguments across all project
categories also reflects the fact that there exist people everywhere who
oppose changes to the environmental status quo.  Putting aside risk percep-
tion mistakes, there is nothing irrational about wanting your local viewshed
to remain unchanged or preferring to avoid even tiny increases in the risk of
environmental harm, for example.  Accordingly, in some of the project cate-
gories that pose few health risks, NGOs tended to mobilize around environ-
mental risks instead.  For example, the Sierra Club’s California/Nevada
Desert Committee, a local organization, broke with the national organization
to oppose “industrial renewables” in the Mojave Desert, based on the threat
solar projects posed to the desert tortoise and other species.168  The predom-
inance of risk-based arguments across all project categories may reflect local
NGOs’ efforts to find arguments that resonate with a broader audience, so as
to grow the size of the opposition.
This focus on mass mobilization around risk is consistent with NGOs’
interest in growing their numbers (in order to grow their influence) and the
notion that risk-based arguments resonate with audiences that may have pre-
viously been unfamiliar with the NGOs’ causes.  By mobilizing people in this
way, they can bring public pressure to bear on decisionmakers to stop disfa-
vored projects.  One might ask, then, why boycotts and protests were rela-
tively infrequently used by the NGOs, given both the ease of mobilizing
people around risk-based concerns and the prominence of high-profile
163 See, e.g., Carbon Pollution, MO. COAL. FOR ENV’T (June 23, 2015), https://moenviron
ment.org/carbon-pollution/ (“[I]t is critical that Missouri shift our energy portfolio away
from coal-fired energy generation to reduce our contribution to climate change.”).
164 See e.g., NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N, DARK HORIZONS: 10 NATIONAL PARKS
MOST THREATENED BY NEW COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS (2008), https://www.npca.org/
resources/1507-dark-horizons-10-national-parks-most-threatened-by-new-coal-fired-power
(“If we fail to stop this plan, our children and grandchildren will inherit national parks
with sick and dying trees, parks with fish so laden with mercury that they are unsafe to eat,
and parks where visitors cannot hike without risking an asthma attack.”).
165 For a comprehensive comparison of the scientific literature and public opinion on
risks associated with fracking, see DANIEL RAIMI, THE FRACKING DEBATE (2017).
166 In the fracking category, the most common health risk complaints were those asso-
ciated with proximity to wells (e.g., burning eyes) and contaminated groundwater (e.g.,
carcinogens leaking into well water).
167 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing Clean Water Act challenges
to pipeline siting).
168 See Renée Owens, The Unpleasant Secrets of Clean Solar Energy, DESERT REP. (Sierra
Club Cal. & Nev. Desert Comm.), Dec. 2016, at 1, 8–9, http://www.desertreport.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/DR-Winter2016.pdf.
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opposition movements such as those waged against the Dakota Access Pipe-
line.169  Table A-1 shows that only in the pipeline category did the prevalence
of boycotts or economic pressure rise to double digits (11%);170 those were
most frequently pushed by national NGOs (23%, as against 4% for local
NGOs), and most of that was aimed at owners of the Keystone and Dakota
Access Pipelines.171  Protests—marches, public rallies, picketing, sit-ins—
were only slightly more common.  They were used mostly in the fossil fuel
infrastructure categories (LNG, pipelines, fracking, and power plants),172
but also by groups opposing solar power (mostly protests at the California
capitol building against development of solar projects in the Mojave Desert).
Even though nuclear power plants are large, capital-intensive, and long-lived
investments that inspire dread,173 few (8%) of the antinuclear NGOs in our
data set urged or organized protests,174 perhaps because most of the projects
that were the object of NGO opposition during the study period were located
adjacent to existing plants in neighborhoods already used to the presence of
nuclear power, or because most never reached the construction stage.175
Despite their less frequent use, protests and boycotts can be seen as com-
plements to NGOs’ risk-based appeals to direct political participation.  By
attracting attention and amplifying public opposition, they exert indirect
169 In 2013, Sierra Club famously lifted its 120-year-old ban on civil disobedience to
support the Keystone XL Pipeline protests.  Lauren Feeney, Why the Sierra Club Lifted Its
Ban on Civil Disobedience to Protest Keystone XL Pipeline, ALTERNET (Feb. 15, 2013), https://
www.alternet.org/2013/02/why-sierra-club-lifted-its-ban-civil-disobedience-protest-key-
stone-xl-pipeline/.
170 The dearth of boycotts in our data may reflect that fact that they are difficult and
expensive to monitor.  If not managed well, they can engender sympathy for the object of
the boycott.
171 Energy Transfer Partners (now Energy Transfer LP) owns the Dakota Access Pipe
Line, as well as the Trans-Pecos Pipeline. See Major Projects, ENERGY TRANSFER, https://
www.energytransfer.com/major-projects/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).  In 2016 pipeline
opponents boycotted a record label owned by the company’s CEO, Kelcy Warren, and
popular Texas musician Jimmy LaFave, who was dying of cancer at the time, provoking
resentment among LaFave and his fans. See Kevin Curtin, Playback: Sunday Morning Coming
Down, AUSTIN CHRON. (May 26, 2017), https://www.austinchronicle.com/music/2017-05-
26/playback-sunday-morning-coming-down/ (quoting LaFave calling the social media
attacks “a witch hunt gone wacko”).
172 Majorities of NGOs in the LNG and pipeline project categories urged or organized
protests, but the tactic also reached double-digit usage rates among groups opposing fossil-
fueled power plants, fracking operations, and solar power.
173 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
174 There were protests against existing nuclear stations during the study period, with
protestors urging their closure, particularly in more left-leaning states (California and New
York). See, e.g., Sean Emery, Hundreds Protest near San Onofre Against Nuclear Energy, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/2012/03/12/hundreds-protest-
near-san-onofre-against-nuclear-energy/; Thomas C. Zambito, Protestors Call for Shutdown of
Indian Point, J. NEWS (June 8, 2016), http://www.lohud.com/story/tech/science/environ-
ment/2016/06/08/protesters-call-shutdown-indian-point/85613178/.
175 Moreover, while almost twenty nuclear plants sought licensing during the study
period, only four ever reached the construction stage (all in South Carolina and Georgia).
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pressure on regulators.  Indeed, many of the protests mounted by NGOs in
our data set were aimed directly at the decisionmakers, as when antiwind
protestors picketed a Department of Interior hearing on the Cape Wind pro-
ject in Massachusetts,176 or anti-fossil-fuel infrastructure protestors staged a
sit-in at FERC offices in 2014.177  Others were aimed directly at project spon-
sors, but in attention-grabbing ways, as when opponents of the pipelines
urged the arrest of Energy Transfer LP’s CEO Kelcy Warren.178  By this same
logic, we might have expected to see more environmental justice claims in
the data, since they seemed to resonate with activists opposing both the
Dakota Access Pipeline and the Cape Wind project.  So it was surprising that
so few NGOs in the data set featured claims about environmental justice (less
than 10% in all but three project categories).  It may be that minority com-
munities are generally underrepresented within the set of organized
NGOs,179 or that many of the project types in our sample are typically located
far from population centers.180
In any case, it seems among NGOs opposing energy projects in the
twenty-first century, mass mobilization around project risks is the default
strategy.  This makes sense.  Not only do risk-based appeals grab voters’ atten-
tion, mass mobilization of political action (and protests) is a particularly effi-
cient method of opposition in the digital era.  Prior to the era of instant
digital communication, this sort of mobilization would have involved group
meetings face to face, or perhaps a telephone tree, or even letter writing.
Now it is instantaneous and virtually costless.
176 Jay Lindsay, Filmmakers Take On Cape Wind Saga in ‘Cape Spin,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (July 31, 2011), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-filmmakers-take-on-
cape-wind-saga-in-cape-spin-2011jul31-story.html (describing pickets at Minerals Manage-
ment Service hearing).
177 See, e.g., Ayesha Rascoe, Anti-Fracking Protesters Arrested Blocking Entrance to Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, HUFFPOST (July 14, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
anti-fracking-protesters-arrested_n_5585675.
178 Jordan Blum & David Hunn, Pipeline Protests Put Kelcy Warren in the Spotlight and
Bull’s-Eye, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
energy/article/Pipeline-protests-put-Kelcy-Warren-in-the-10628354.php.
179 See discussion supra note 150 and accompanying text.
180 We did see some environmental justice claims made against utility-scale power
plants, most of which involved southeastern states, where preexisting environmental jus-
tice-focused NGOs are more common.  The Southern Alliance for Clean Energy objected
to coal-fired plants, because “[t]he consequences of high-risk energy choices, like climate
change and pollution, disproportionately impact communities of color, lower-income
households, coastal areas, and other groups.” Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, SOUTHERN
ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, https://cleanenergy.org/diversity-equity-inclusion/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 27, 2019).  Everglades Earth First! opposed Florida Power & Light plants located
near Seminole communities. See Updates from the Seminole Opposition to FPL in the Everglades,
EARTH FIRST! NEWSWIRE (Apr. 14, 2014), https://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/2014/04/
14/updates-from-the-seminole-opposition-to-fpl-in-the-everglades/.  An analogous regional
effect may be at work in the LNG category as well, since the environmental justice move-
ment grew out of the southeastern states, see supra note 147, and most LNG terminals are
located in the South, see Appendix B.
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B. Amplification of Risk
Table A-2 shows that variation in incidence of risk-based claims does not
track neatly with variation in the size of the risks posed across project types,
suggesting that other factors sometimes drive the focus on risk.  Stated differ-
ently, while it is common for groups opposing particularly risky or dreaded
technologies to invoke risk as a reason to oppose projects, it is also common
for groups opposing other project types to base their appeals on risk.  Look-
ing behind the numbers, many NGOs made claims about health risks associ-
ated with wind farms, smart meters, transmission lines, fracking operations,
and nuclear power that are not supported by the weight of the scientific
record.181
Some of these amplified or exaggerated risk claims seem consistent with
the Slovic psychometric paradigm, in which risks of real harms are not dis-
counted by the probability that they will occur (misrepresenting probabili-
ties);182 others were simply claims of harm that are unsupported by the
weight of scientific opinion (misrepresenting harms).  Opposition to nuclear
power plants continues to fall into the first category in ways Slovic noted
thirty years ago, and the 2010 accident at Fukushima reinforced those fears,
even though scholars estimate that the risk posed by nuclear power is very
small.183  Something similar appears to be at work in NGO arguments about
pipelines.  The effects of a pipeline leak can be serious—environmental
harm to waterways and wetlands, for example.  However, the probability that
any particular pipeline will leak is very small.184  Public perceptions of the
risk of groundwater contamination from fracking may reflect a similar reluc-
tance to discount the harm by the probability.185  Consistent with the notion
181 See discussion supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
182 Slovic, supra note 142.
183 Scholars estimate that the number of people who died in the evacuation associated
with the Fukushima accident will be ten times the number of premature deaths likely to
result from the radiation release at Fukushima. E.g., George Johnson, When Radiation Isn’t
the Real Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/science/
when-radiation-isnt-the-real-risk.html; Richard Martin, The Effects of Fukushima Linger After
Five Years, But Not from Radiation, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.technology
review.com/s/601011/the-effects-of-fukushima-linger-after-five-years-but-not-from-radia-
tion/.  Estimates of premature deaths associated with the explosion at Chernobyl were
significantly larger, but a comparatively small fraction to the number of premature deaths
attributable to coal-fired power annually. See Mary Mycio, How Many People Have Really Been
Killed by Chernobyl?, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health_and_science/explainer/2013/04/chernobyl_death_toll_how_many_cancer_cases_
are_caused_by_low_level_radiation.html (explaining that it is difficult to know why the esti-
mates differ significantly because it is difficult to know if Chernobyl is directly linked to the
deaths); see also Epstein et al., supra note 138, at 91–93.
184 See supra note 27–30 and accompanying text (describing the Gasland-inspired mis-
taken beliefs about the magnitude of health risks associated with fracking operations);
Roger T. Hill, Pipeline Risk Analysis, INSTITUTION CHEMICAL ENGINEERS SYMP. SERIES, no. 130,
1992, at 657, https://engage.aiche.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.
ashx?DocumentFileKey=6262d4f9-7a5d-4d70-ab70-57e8e0207d5a.
185 See RAIMI, supra note 165, at 53.
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of dread and the psychometric paradigm, these appeals resonate in ways
probabilities do not, because they reference real accidents that caused real
harm.
Claims about wind farms, transmission lines, and smart meters fall into
the latter category, misrepresentation not of probabilities but of harms.
Many of the NGOs in our sample advanced claims that transmission lines and
smart meters emit radio frequency regulation that causes cancer.  For exam-
ple, Hope for the Hills linked transmission lines to “increased risk of develop-
ing brain tumors, childhood leukemia, ALS, more commonly known as Lou
Gehrig’s disease, and an elevated number of miscarriages.”186  The messag-
ing of the Center for Electrosmog Prevention warned that smart meters
“blanket[ ] entire communities and states with non-ionizing radiation” that is
associated with “alarming symptoms and illness.”187  The National Research
Council and the World Health Organization, among others, characterize
these claims as unsupported by the scientific evidence.188  Similarly, numer-
ous opponents of wind farms in our sample cited “wind turbine syndrome,” a
combination of headaches, dizziness and nausea, in their literature.189  For
example, Fight the Wind, an Ohio antiwind group, references “the constant
noise, flicker, and infra-sound of wind turbines,” and claims that they “take a
toll on your health.”190  Scholars have cast doubt on wind turbine syn-
186 The Impact of Overhead High Voltage Transmission Towers and Lines on Eligibility for Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA) Insured Mortgage Programs: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Ins., Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 8 (2012)
(statement of Bob Goodwin, President, Hope for the Hills).
187 Center for Electrosmog Prevention’s No Smart Meter Campaign, CTR. FOR ELECTROSMOG
PREVENTION, http://www.electrosmogprevention.org/center-for-electrosmog-prevention-
anti-smart-meter-campaign/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
188 COMM. ON THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS ON BIOLOGIC SYS.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO RESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS 2 (1997) (meta-analysis showing that “the current body of evi-
dence does not show that exposure to these fields presents a human-health hazard”);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY FIELDS 12 (2007), https://www.who.int/
peh-emf/publications/Complet_DEC_2007.pdf?ua=1 (“[O]n balance, the evidence is not
strong enough to be considered causal . . . .”); see also Jarry T. Porsius et al., Health Responses
to a New High-Voltage Power Line Route: Design of a Quasi-Experimental Prospective Field Study in
the Netherlands, 14 BMC PUB. HEALTH 237, 238 (2014) (describing studies showing increase
in symptoms following exposure to sham radio frequency radiation).
189 The work of Dr. Nina Pierpont, a pediatrician, is often cited in support of this phe-
nomenon. See Wind Turbine Syndrome: Hearing Before the Energy Comm., 2006 Leg., 229th
Sess. 2 (N.Y. 2006) (testimony of Dr. Nina Pierpont, Fellow, American Academy of Pediat-
rics), https://docs.wind-watch.org/Pierpont-WindTurbineSyndrome.pdf.  National Wind
Watch and several other groups in the data set cited wind turbine syndrome as a basis for
opposition.  Wind Wise Massachusetts, for example, opposes “industrial wind turbines” as
causes of “vibroacoustic disease.”  Thomas A. Jones, Wind Turbine Syndrome and Vibroacoustic
Disease, WIND WISE MASS., https://windwisema.org/about/noise/wind-turbine-syndrome-
and-vibroacoustic-disease/ (last visited Sep. 15, 2019).
190 The Negative Effects, FIGHT WIND, http://www.fightthewind.com/the-negatives (last
visited Sep. 15, 2019).
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drome,191 noting that the pattern of noise and health complaints do not
match proximity to the turbines, and tended to increase after opposition
groups began to feature health concerns in their advocacy positions.192
Before imputing ignorance to those who are persuaded by NGOs’ mis-
representation of harms, it is important to recognize that NGOs support the
claims with citations to very well-qualified, but dissenting, members of the
scientific community,193 and it may be that the symptoms described are real.
Some scholars ascribe these claims to the “nocebo effect,” a phenomenon in
which subjects experience expected symptoms after exposure to a stimulus or
attribute existing symptoms to a suggested stimulus.194  Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to generalize about (and to disentangle) the motivations behind these
191 A 2014 meta-analysis of then-available studies concluded that “[c]urrently, there is
no further existing statistically-significant evidence indicating any association between wind
turbine noise exposure and tinnitus, hearing loss, vertigo or headache.”  Jesper Hvass
Schmidt & Mads Klokker, Health Effects Related to Wind Turbine Noise Exposure: A Systematic
Review, PLOS ONE, Dec. 4, 2014, at 1, e114183, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0114183&type=printable. The Australian Medical Associa-
tion says that “[t]he available Australian and international evidence does not support the
view that the infrasound or low frequency sound generated by wind farms, as they are
currently regulated in Australia, causes adverse health effects on populations residing in
their vicinity.” AUSTL. MED. ASS’N, WIND FARMS AND HEALTH 1 (2014), http://
waubrafoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/AMA-Statement-Wiind-Farms-
and-Health-2014.pdf.
192 Simon Chapman et al., The Pattern of Complaints About Australian Wind Farms Does Not
Match the Establishment and Distribution of Turbines: Support for the Psychogenic, ‘Communicated
Disease’ Hypothesis, PLOS ONE, Oct. 16, 2013, at 1, e76584, https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076584&type=printable (finding nocebo
effects in noise or health complaints associated with wind farms); Fiona Crichton et al.,
Can Expectations Produce Symptoms from Infrasound Associated with Wind Turbines?, 33 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 360, 363 (2014), http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ehost/pdf
viewer/pdfviewer?vid=10&sid=dbdb500d-8ff5-4389-803a-0c8c5be92298%40pdc-v-sessmgr03
(finding that “elevated concerns about the health effects of sound produced by wind tur-
bines” can be tied to hearing about the adverse health effects that might be linked to wind
farms).
193 Regarding the effects of radio frequency radiation from power lines and smart
meters, most of the NGOs cite David O. Carpenter, Professor and Director of the Institute
for Health and the Environment at the University at Albany, and a Harvard-educated medi-
cal doctor. See, e.g., Dr. David Carpenter’s Letter to BG&E, MD. SMART METER AWARENESS
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://marylandsmartmeterawareness.org/general-info/dr-david-
carpenters-letter-to-bge/ (detailing his views about the risks of smart meters).  The most-
cited expert on wind turbine syndrome is Dr. Nina Pierpont. See supra note 189.
194 E.g., Paul Enck & Winfried Häuser, Beware the Nocebo Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/opinion/sunday/beware-the-nocebo-
effect.html (explaining their research into side effects experienced by drug trial patients
taking placebos, and that “expectations can also do harm”); Porsius et al., supra note 188,
at 238, 245 (discussing the possible role of nocebo effects in health complaints about
power lines); Chapman, et al., supra note 192 (discussing the role of nocebo effects in
complaints about wind farms); see also Phelim McAleer’s documentary, FrackNation, which
suggests that some of the health symptoms depicted in the movie Gasland were caused by
nocebo effects. FRACKNATION (AXS TV broadcast Jan. 22, 2013).
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exaggerated or unsupported claims.  Because scientific consensus evolves
over time, it is of course possible that some of these apparently hyperbolic
claims will be proven correct, however unlikely that seems now.  The nocebo
effect suggests that some portion of these claims are sincere, not fabricated.
Other NGOs may adopt these arguments instrumentally in order to
strengthen opposition to projects opposed for other reasons, to build a
broader base of opposition.  The lack of scientific basis for some of the
health risk claims made by NGOs may partly explain the gap between the
percentages of national and local NGOs making health risk claims in the
wind, transmission, and solar categories.  The average local NGO in those
three categories is more than twenty percent more likely to make health risk
claims in opposition to those types of energy projects; there is no comparable
gap in the data for fossil fuel infrastructure, presumably because those pro-
ject types offer NGOs more in the way of scientifically supported health risk
appeals.195
C. Interconnectedness (and Coordination?)
In a number of disparate ways, the data also support the inference that
NGOs are using modern communication tools to learn from, and coordinate
with, each other.  This seems most evident in NGO tactical and issue choices
in the fossil fuel project categories, but it also shows up in other ways as well.
Consistent with H1, one might expect that because formal legal inter-
vention in siting and judicial proceedings entails significant costs, it would be
the exclusive province of sophisticated national NGOs.  However, as Table A-
1 indicates, that was not the case.  More than half of the NGOs opposing
fossil-fueled power plants, pipelines, and nuclear power plants employed liti-
gation as a tool of opposition, as did more than one-fourth of the NGOs
opposing LNG terminals, wind and solar power plants, and smart meter rol-
louts.196  Many of these NGOs were local.  One possible reason for this is that
modern communication has reduced the transaction costs for national NGOs
of mobilizing legal opposition.  National groups can bear the information
costs of legal intervention by providing local groups with “how to” advice for
intervening formally in siting proceedings.
In the fossil fuel project categories, tactical similarities between national
and local groups may be a product of specific national campaigns under-
taken during the study period, particularly by Sierra Club and 350.org.
195 Indeed, as Table A-2 indicates, national groups are slightly more likely to raise
health-risk claims in opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure. See infra Table A-2.
196 In several recent cases NGOs have used litigation to try to stop FERC-approved natu-
ral gas pipelines, with mixed success. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
909 F.3d 635, 639 (4th Cir. 2018) (overturning a construction permit for a pipeline);
Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (overturning FERC approval of
three natural gas pipeline projects bringing gas to power plants in the southeastern United
States); Const. Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87, 90–91
(2d Cir. 2017) (upholding New York State’s denial of a water quality certificate to the
pipeline).
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Sierra Club’s “Beyond Coal” campaign (and its more recent  “Beyond Dirty
Fuels Initiative”) enlist local groups to oppose fossil fuel infrastructure.197
Similarly, 350.org cofounder Bill McKibben has used opposition to pipelines
as a way to create and sustain a federal network of activist organizations dedi-
cated to opposing fossil fuel infrastructure.198  The success of these national
campaigns may have attracted the support necessary to fund the high litiga-
tion rates in the pipeline and fossil-fueled power plant categories.199  Both
the Sierra Club and 350.org have found success using high-profile fossil fuel
projects200 to mobilize legal opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure among
local groups and motivate individuals (judging by the numbers in Table A-
1).201
These coordinated national campaigns may also explain the higher inci-
dence of protest as a tool of opposition in the fossil fuel project categories.
Protest is costly in time and effort (though advocating it is not) and some-
times entails physical and legal risk; it may be that opponents of fossil fuel
infrastructure are more motivated to direct action and protest than oppo-
nents of other types of energy projects.  The propensity to protest among
local NGOs opposing these projects was probably also driven in part by the
calls to direct action by 350.org, Food & Water Watch, and other national
groups.  These groups offered a straightforward and compelling rationale for
protest: namely, that avoiding unacceptable levels of global warming requires
keeping carbon in the ground (“unburn[able] carbon”), which in turn sug-
197 Maya Weber, Sierra Club Ups Investment in Blocking Natural Gas, PLATTS GAS DAILY,
Oct. 3, 2016 (S&P Glob., London, UK); Mark Hand, Sierra Club’s Campaigning Extends
Beyond Coal To ‘Dirty Fuels,’ SNL ENERGY DAILY GAS REP., Apr. 20, 2016 (SNL Fin., Char-
lottesville, Va).
198 McKibben, supra note 35 (describing the mobilizing force of the Keystone project).
199 Information about which local groups benefit from the financial assistance of
national NGOs is difficult to come by, but the Sierra Club has long financed legal and
political action by local organizations through the Sierra Club Foundation.  The Sierra
Club Foundation’s annual report delineates the amounts given by purpose or goal, but
does not include specific information about grants to particular Sierra Club chapters or
other NGOs. E.g., SIERRA CLUB FOUND., PARTNERING FOR PROGRESS 18–19 (2017).
200 John Cassidy, The Symbolic Politics of Keystone XL, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2015), https:/
/www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-symbolic-politics-of-keystone-xl.
201 Why was litigation used less often by NGOs opposing fracking?  There is little incen-
tive for NGOs to intervene formally in regulatory agency proceedings governing approval
of fracking projects.  These approvals are made well by well, and each developer may drill
tens or hundreds of wells in any particular local area.  Therefore, the costs of contesting
each approval are prohibitively high for NGOs.  In that context it may make much more
sense for NGOs to focus on lobbying state and local legislative bodies to ban or restrict
fracking.  Those efforts show up in the political action column of our database.  The litiga-
tion burden falls on municipalities that seek to ban or regulate fracking within their bor-
ders, and municipalities do not show up in our data set.  These factors, considered against
the very large number of antifracking NGOs, result in a low incidence of litigation in that
project category.  The database contains more antifracking NGOs than any other project
category, and almost eighty percent of those groups are local groups whose efforts are
probably more profitably spent lobbying local officials to impose fracking bans.
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gests that we ought not to build additional infrastructure to serve the fossil
fuel market.202  Those messages may have resonated especially among
younger voters, among whom concern about climate change is higher,203
and for whom the opportunity costs of protest are lower.
Top-down organizational efforts may also explain similarity between
local and national NGOs’ use of litigation, political action, and issue argu-
ments in other project categories as well:  National Wind Watch offers how-to
advice to local antiwind groups by way of the “[l]egal documents” part of its
website.204  The aforementioned use of nearly identical health-risk-based
arguments by far flung local NGOs in opposition to wind farms, smart
meters, and transmission lines205 may also be evidence of horizontal coordi-
nation—or the ease of information sharing and signaling in the digital envi-
ronment—as well.
None of this is terribly surprising, but its rapid growth is new.  The ease
with which NGOs can share information and coordinate tactics helps them
overcome organizational disadvantages in the contest to shape regulatory
decisionmaking and improves their ability to oppose new infrastructure.
D. The Geography, Ideology, and Effects of NGO Opposition
What does it matter if NGOs are better able to use risk-based arguments
to mobilize political and legal opposition to energy projects than they once
were?  Has the new politics of market entry raised barriers to entry for new
energy infrastructure?  Has it changed the regulatory environment in other
ways?  Our data do not offer a systematic quantitative answer to these ques-
tions, but we can nevertheless draw some important inferences from these
data.
1. A Caveat: Measurement Difficulties
First, an important caveat: measuring the effects of NGO opposition on
project outcomes is extremely difficult.  Except for the fossil-fueled power
plant and transmission project categories (and perhaps nuclear power),206
202 Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-
20120719 (discussing the notion of unburnable carbon as a reason to stop building fossil
fuel infrastructure).
203 Julianne Hodges, Poll Finds Millennials More Concerned About Energy and the Environ-
ment, DAILY TEXAN (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.dailytexanonline.com/2016/04/20/poll-
finds-millennials-more-concerned-about-energy-and-the-environment (reporting results of
the UT Energy Poll, showing a gap between young and old voters on this issue).
204 Selected Documents: Some Important Documents About Industrial Wind Energy, Legal Docu-
ments, NAT’L WIND WATCH, https://www.wind-watch.org/documents.php (last visited Sept.
27, 2019) (offering examples of agreements to protect neighbors from the effects of wind
turbines).
205 See supra Part I.
206 We were able to use data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration to iden-
tify all of the proposed projects above certain size thresholds—major projects—in these
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we cannot be confident that our data set includes every (or even nearly
every) proposed project in each project category during the study period
because the data set was built around NGOs and the particular projects they
opposed.  Moreover, even if the data set included all proposed projects
within each category, we would still be unable to quantify the effectiveness of
NGO opposition because of a basic endogeneity problem: that is, even a
more complete set of proposed projects would itself be a censored sample of
the potentially lucrative projects that investors might have pursued but for
the anticipated strength of NGO opposition in certain locations.207
Furthermore, ascribing causal effect to a particular tool of opposition is
difficult because of the number and complexity of social, economic, and
political forces at work in determining project outcomes.  Projects may suc-
ceed or fail for any of a dozen or more reasons, and NGOs collectively battle
projects on multiple fronts, winning on some and losing on others.  Siting
proceedings are sometimes not determinative of particular project outcomes.
Sometimes NGOs lose all the important battles but win the war, as with the
Cape Wind project, which earned all the necessary regulatory approvals but
died after regulatory delays extended the conflict beyond the expiration of
the power purchase contract on which the proposed project was financed.208
Sometimes NGOs win important battles but lose the war because of political
change, as when early victories before the Obama administration that
seemed to sink the Keystone XL Pipeline were reversed under the Trump
administration,209 or local government decisions on proposed fracking oper-
ations were overturned by state legislatures.210  Sometimes NGOs’ victories
on ancillary issues can stop a project, sometimes not.  For example, NGOs
have begun to win battles in pipeline siting disputes by persuading the State
of New York to reject required approvals under the Clean Water Act,211 and
persuading courts that FERC NEPA reviews for pipelines are flawed.212  How
do we measure success in these complex situations?  Both of the last two pipe-
line examples are “victories” for NGOs in some sense.  However, the former
two categories.  We cannot be as certain about the completeness of the project data set in
the other project categories.
207 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 150 (discussing how sponsors of hazardous waste facil-
ities avoid siting them in areas with politically active populations).
208 See Ros Davidson, Cape Wind: Requiem for a Dream, WINDPOWER MONTHLY (May 1,
2018), https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1462962/cape-wind-requiem-dream
(noting that the “project would never recover” after several different conflicts).
209 See Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by Obama,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/keystone-
dakota-pipeline-trump.html (“In his latest moves to dismantle the legacy of his predeces-
sor, Mr. Trump resurrected the Keystone XL pipeline that has stirred years of debate, and
expedited another pipeline in the Dakotas that had become a major flash point for Native
Americans.”).
210 See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text (describing the fracking preemption
issue).
211 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 645, 654 (4th Cir. 2018).
212 See Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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may well kill pipeline projects that the FERC would otherwise approve, while
the latter victory may be hollow, as the FERC merely corrects the defect in
the NEPA review and approves projects anyway.213
For these reasons, reaching general conclusions about the effectiveness
of particular tactical and issue approaches to opposition is beyond the scope
of this project.  However, the data do permit us to draw some preliminary
inferences about when and where NGO opposition is most prevalent, and
about how geography and ideology might be driving opposition and thereby
influencing entry into energy markets.  Appendix B contains information
about the geographical distribution of the NGOs and types of energy projects
examined in this analysis, as well as information about citizen ideology (lib-
eral vs. conservative) by state.
2. Fossil Fuel Infrastructure and Opposition
Looking first at the fossil fuel infrastructure (power plants, pipelines,
fracking, and LNG terminals) data in Appendix B, the existence or nonexis-
tence of NGO opposition within a state roughly tracks the distribution of
projects (as expected).  With the exception of antifracking NGOs (some of
which exist beyond the boundaries of potential oil and gas production
areas),214 in places where there are no proposed infrastructure projects, gen-
erally there is no opposition, and some opposition arose in virtually every
state in which projects were proposed.  These correlations seem strongest in
the LNG category, and less strong (but strong nevertheless) in the fossil-
fueled power plant and pipeline categories.
However, the intensity of opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure (as mea-
sured by number of opposition NGOs by state) seems less well correlated
with the intensity of proposed development (as measured by number of pro-
ject proposals), and the pattern suggests that political ideology may play a
role in driving this measure of opposition intensity.  Relatively little NGO
opposition to fossil-fueled power plants arose in “red” states like Texas and
Kentucky, for example, considering the relatively large number of proposed
projects there.  Similarly, considering the concentration of pipeline projects
in the midsection of the country, there is relatively little NGO opposition in
“red” states like North Dakota and Nebraska,215 while opposition to pipelines
in the eastern part of the country (and especially the Northeast) seems to be
more intense.  Nor do the “red” states hosting the largest number of LNG
213 The Clean Water Act certificate is legally required for the project to move forward,
while the defect the court identified in the FERC’s environmental review is curable by
republishing the environmental impact statement.
214 Vermont’s fracking ban, for example, is merely symbolic or expressive, as there are
not shale hydrocarbon resources in Vermont. See infra Appendix B.
215 The Keystone Pipeline was an exception to this generalization.  Its original route
traversed an important groundwater aquifer in Nebraska, inciting the opposition of
Nebraskans of all political stripes. See Michael Avok, Nebraska Lawmakers Vote to Reroute Oil
Pipeline, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-pipeline-
nebraska/nebraska-lawmakers-vote-to-reroute-oil-pipeline-idUSTRE7AF1QK20111116.
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project proposals (Texas and Louisiana) host the largest concentration of
anti-LNG NGOs.  To the contrary, the two LNG proposals attracting the most
opposition during the study period were in “blue” states: Maryland’s Cove
Point LNG export expansion project (opposed by thirty-one NGOs) and Ore-
gon’s Jordan Cove Project (opposed by fifteen NGOs).216  Generally speak-
ing, NGO opposition to other fossil fuel infrastructure in the “blue” states of
California and Oregon also seems relatively intense compared to the inten-
sity of development there.  The picture of NGO opposition to fracking seems
to be correlated with state ideology as well, when one considers the geo-
graphic distribution of shale oil and gas production areas.217
Indeed, opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure may be even more intense
in “blue” states than the data indicate, because of a censored sample problem
there.  For example, during the study period developers did not propose any
large coal-fired power plants in California, New York, Oregon, Connecticut,
or Maryland (and proposed only one in Massachusetts, which was rejected);
they did propose major natural-gas-fired plants in each of those states, and
most of those were approved over NGO opposition.  By contrast, developers
proposed ten coal-fired and two gas projects (that were large enough to fit
our definition of “major” projects) in Texas; the two gas plants were
approved and built, and seven of the ten coal-fired plants were rejected.  By
those measures, NGOs had more success in Texas than they did in the afore-
mentioned “blue” states; in all likelihood, the reality is that developers fore-
saw the futility of proposing fossil-fueled power plants in those more liberal
states and so never proposed projects there.  In the LNG data set the censor-
ing effects of political ideology may be even stronger.  During the study
period, Asia and Europe were the most potentially lucrative markets for natu-
ral gas, yet very few projects are proposed on the East or West Coasts of the
United States.  The intensity of opposition to the Maryland and Oregon pro-
ject proposals indicates that developers’ caution about those locations would
have been warranted.
Thus, political ideology appears to play a role in the intensity of opposi-
tion to new fossil fuel infrastructure.  It sometimes manifests as defeat in sit-
216 One imagines that had the New York Port Ambrose project not been abandoned
early on it might have attracted opposition from more than the twelve NGOs in our data
set that actively opposed it. NY Governor Cuomo Vetoes Port Ambrose LNG Project, WORLD MAR.
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2015), https://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/176439/ny-governor-
cuomo-vetoes-port-ambrose-lng-project/.
217 We might also expect to see property-rights-based opposition to pipelines from the
ideological right, but we do not.  It may be that this particular driver of opposition is
understated by our measure of intensity—the number of NGOs—for two reasons.  First, it
may be that property rights activists opposing pipelines do not do so by forming or joining
NGOs, since they have the option of refusing to sell their property and fighting condemna-
tion in court as individuals.  This would not explain why nearby landowners who oppose
the pipeline, but whose land is not taken, have not joined or formed opposition groups,
however.  Second, if property rights conservatism is negatively correlated with wealth, it
may be that people asserting property-rights-based opposition are less likely to overcome
the transaction cost obstacles to forming or joining NGOs in the first place.
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ing proceedings; other times it manifests in the geographic distribution of
project proposals in the first place.  Given the growing ideological polariza-
tion and prominent decarbonization campaigns by NGOs during the study
period, this is unsurprising.
3. Lower-Carbon Infrastructure and Opposition
What about the other, lower-carbon energy projects: nuclear, wind,
solar, transmission, and smart meters?  Do we observe the same trends there?
As with fossil fuel projects, the existence or nonexistence of NGO opposition
in a state roughly tracks the distribution of projects and seems to be some-
what stronger in left-leaning states.  A review of the maps in Appendix B con-
firms that this is the case, with one prominent exception.218  That exception
is the nuclear project category, where the correlation between the intensity
of development and of opposition is very strong, irrespective of state ideol-
ogy.  This is perhaps unsurprising given the well-documented risk-based aver-
sion nuclear power inspires.219  When one considers that most of these
projects never neared fruition, the rise of opposition against every proposed
project is an impressive testament to that sentiment.220
In the transmission and utility-scale solar project categories, we see the
effect of development intensity and state ideology on opposition intensity.
The most intense opposition to solar projects arises in California, which also
has the most intense solar development, and other states with lots of solar
development also appear to host a large number of antisolar NGOs.  How-
ever, we see underrepresentation of NGO opposition in some “red” states,
particularly moderately conservative North Carolina, and overrepresentation
of opposition in solidly “blue” Maryland, for example.  The same is true for
transmission: opposition roughly tracks development, with a few exceptions
in the ideologically conservative southcentral and southwestern parts of the
country.  Some of the most intense pockets of transmission development are
located in “red” states (Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, and Arizona)
where relatively little opposition has arisen.
In the wind category, correlations between development intensity and
opposition intensity weaken further; the correlation between state ideology
and opposition is stronger.  Opposition to wind projects is strong in the
Northeast, middle Atlantic states, and California, all of which have seen some
wind development.  However, wind development has been particularly strong
218 For smart meters, a small N problem confounds our attempts to draw generaliza-
tions about opposition.  The map shows that there are several states in which smart meters
were installed in more than half the households, yet little or no opposition arose.  Simi-
larly, most of the NGOs opposing smart meters are found in blue California and red Texas.
219 See Slovic, supra note 142.
220 The only two nuclear power projects from our data set to navigate all the regulatory
hurdles and reach the construction stage were located in Georgia and South Carolina;
those two states offered project sponsors revenue guarantees that improved project eco-
nomics for those projects just as the business case for nuclear energy declined in the face
of the fracking revolution.
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in the midsection of the country along a corridor that runs from Texas north
to the Canadian border, yet NGO opposition is relatively weak in those states.
The intensity of opposition in the middle Atlantic states, as compared to the
central plains states, may be traceable to political ideology, or it may reflect
the different nature of wind development in those places.  In hilly terrain,
wind projects are often sited on the tops of ridges, provoking opposition on
aesthetic grounds, particularly in areas of higher population density.  That
may also be why wind comprises only about three percent of electricity gener-
ation in New England, home of many windy mountaintops.221  In the central
plains, wind turbines sit in the middle of large farms and ranches character-
ized by low population density, which may provoke less opposition on aes-
thetic grounds, all else equal.
Finally, in the low-carbon project categories it is more difficult to genera-
lize about the effects of opposition on project success.  The business case for
nuclear power took a sharp turn for the worse after 2007, and the failure of
most projects after that probably had little to do with NGO opposition or
state ideology, though few if any projects were proposed in states that were
hostile to nuclear power.222  NGOs opposing solar projects in California were
not particularly successful, probably because the governor’s forceful advocacy
for utility-scale solar there influenced state regulators.223  More generally,
transmission projects tended to succeed in (a) traditionally regulated mar-
kets like the Southeast, where projects were located within utility service
areas; (b) Texas, where state law favored development;224 or (c) in the so-
called “MISO” market,225 where the projects were developed and pushed for-
ward by a transmission-planning stakeholder process.  Projects tended to be
221 Resource Mix, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/resource-
mix/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019); see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WIND POWER IN
NEW ENGLAND 1 (2007), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/wpne-over-
view.pdf (“New England has excellent wind resources . . . .”).
222 For a list of state laws opposing nuclear power development, maintained by the
National Conference of State Legislatures, see State Restrictions on New Nuclear Power Facility
Construction, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-
and-natural-resources/states-restrictions-on-new-nuclear-power-facility.aspx (last updated
May 2017).
223 In 2011, Governor Jerry Brown vowed to “crush” local opposition to utility-scale
solar projects, and has had a hand in appointing regulators who oversee those projects.
Debra Kahn, Calif. Governor Vows to ‘Crush’ Foes of Renewable Energy, N.Y. TIMES (July 26,
2011), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/26/26greenwire-
calif-governor-vows-to-crush-foes-of-renewable-22698.html?pagewanted=all.
224 See Robert Bradley Jr., Texas’s CREZ Transmission Line: Wind Power’s $7 Billion Subsidy
(Ratebase Socialism as ‘Infrastructure Improvement’), MASTER RESOURCE (Feb. 16, 2018), https:/
/www.masterresource.org/cre/texass-crez-transmission-line-wind-powers-7-billion-sub
sidy/.
225 MISO is the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, an electric grid and mar-
ket operator whose territory extends from North Dakota and Minnesota south to Louisi-
ana, and comprises a large section of the central plains and Midwest. See About MISO,
MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ (last visited Sep. 5, 2019).  The MISO plan-
ning process for transmission investment is explained in MISO, MULTI VALUE PROJECT
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unsuccessful in the left-leaning states of the Northeast.  Projects were few in
New England, and mostly unsuccessful there, the Northern Pass project
being the most noteworthy example.226  New York has experienced similar
problems and delays,227 and the state is turning toward encouraging distrib-
uted energy projects located near demand centers due to the difficulty of
siting transmission in that state.228  In sum, in the low carbon project catego-
ries, there was little if any correlation between project success rates and state
ideology, though any such effects may be confounded by other variables or
our censored sample of projects.
IV. REGULATION, POLITICS, AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
It seems from the data that conflict over energy market entry reflects our
polarized and digitally connected twenty-first-century politics.  More specifi-
cally, this analysis suggests that: (1) NGO opposition to energy projects most
often seeks to focus broad public attention on project risks; (2) when oppos-
ing non-fossil-fuel infrastructure, local NGOs are more likely than national
NGOs to amplify public perception of risks in their messaging; (3) NGO
resistance to energy infrastructure is more likely in “blue” states than “red”
states, all else equal; and (4) the prospect of intense NGO opposition may
also be dissuading prospective investors from proposing projects in some
locations.  What do these findings signify for the regulation of energy mar-
kets?  They seem consistent with the idea that NGOs—even local NGOs—are
relatively sophisticated political actors using the tools of persuasion they have
available to push decisionmakers toward their desired ends—whether those
ends involve stopping a particular project (local NGOs), influencing the
larger energy mix (national NGOs), or some combination of the two.
If one subscribes to theories of capture and business dominance of the
regulatory process, NGOs’ emphasis on mobilizing around risk makes sense
as a way to overcome resource disadvantages (relative to firms) in the contest
to shape decisions.  Capture suggests that because of businesses’ resource
advantages in the policy process, regulators are systematically biased toward
PORTFOLIO 7 (2012), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2011%20MVP%20Portfolio%20Analysis
%20Full%20Report117059.pdf.
226 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
227 See Marie J. French, Slow Progress on Transmission Lines Worries Energy Industry, POLIT-
ICO (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/01/
09/slow-progress-on-transmission-lines-worries-energy-industry-180023 (discussing the
“slow pace of progress on new large-scale transmission projects”).
228 The New York plan, known as “Reforming the Energy Vision,” would attempt to
create an institutional and legal environment that encourages smaller, decentralized gen-
erators (including households owning generation like rooftop solar) to buy and sell energy
directly to one another rather than have consumers buy solely from larger retailers who
acquire their power from central stations.  For more about the New York plan, see 2015
New York State Energy Plan, N.Y. ST., https://energyplan.ny.gov/Plans/2015.aspx (last vis-
ited Sept. 27, 2019).
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project sponsors,229 an idea that seems particularly attractive in the Trump
era given the evident corruption and proindustry orientation of some regula-
tors in the Trump administration.230  It is also an idea that has long enjoyed
the support of (mostly right-leaning) public choice scholars,231 and (mostly
left-leaning) revisionist historians.232  But despite its popularity, the capture
hypothesis has not fared particularly well under academic scrutiny.  The
canonical pieces in the capture literature consist mostly of “theory-plus-anec-
dote” accounts.233  In a recent book-length review of the capture literature,
entitled “Failures of Capture Scholarship,”234 political scientist Daniel Car-
penter observes that scholars have had considerable difficulty “demonstrat-
ing the existence and degree of capture” despite the fact that their
“evidentiary standards . . . are rather low.”235  All of this suggests that default-
ing to capture explanations for pro-development siting decisions may be
unwarranted.
Rather, the more mundane story is closer to reality: namely, that NGOs
participate in a system in which regulators seek to discharge their statutory
duties and to strike a balance between reliability, affordability, and environ-
mental performance—one that is consistent with their sense of the public
interest.  That balance, quite understandably, changes across time and space.
NGOs and their business adversaries make tactical and issue choices to try to
229 See supra notes 12–14 and Section I.A for a summary of recent political science
literature on the business dominance hypothesis.
230 Scott Pruitt’s reign at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) combined
unprecedented levels of corruption and apparent probusiness bias. See Oliver Milman &
Dominic Rushe, New EPA Head Scott Pruitt’s Emails Reveal Close Ties with Fossil Fuel Interests,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/22/
scott-pruitt-emails-oklahoma-fossil-fuels-koch-brothers.  This is to suggest that there is an
important conceptual distinction to be made between probusiness decisions driven by cor-
ruption and those driven by an ideological preference.  For a discussion of why this mat-
ters, and of the literature on capture, see infra notes 231–35.
231 See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 212 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
232 The most prominent example is Gabriel Kolko. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATIONS, 1877–1916 (1965). It may also be enjoying a resurgence of popularity on
the political left. See, e.g., MACLEAN, supra note 12; MAYER, supra note 12.
233 Christopher Carrigan and Cary Coglianese’s review of one of capture theory’s semi-
nal works concluded recently that it “exaggerate[s] the power of business over regula-
tors, . . . suggest[ing] . . . nearly an iron law of business control that clearly does not exist.”
Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Capturing Regulatory Reality: Stigler’s The Theory
of Economic Regulation, at abstract (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Faculty Scholarship, Paper No.
1650, 2016) https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1650/.
234 Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to Failures of Capture Scholarship, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 1, 1–22 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
235 Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAP-
TURE, supra note 234, at 57, 57; see also Boyd, supra note 3, at 1636, 1651–58 (challenging
the capture hypothesis as applied to public utility commissions); David B. Spence & Frank
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 121–23 (2000) (chal-
lenging the evidentiary support for capture theory).
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influence how regulators strike that balance.  Those efforts influence out-
comes, but so do other factors, including other intervenors, the legal envi-
ronment, the preferences of political overseers, and public opinion.  Indeed,
there is evidence that the general public (as distinguished from NGOs) tends
to be mildly supportive of new energy infrastructure,236 and regulators’ deci-
sions in the energy siting disputes studied here seem better explained by the
combined influence of these various contextual forces than by pervasive busi-
ness dominance.  Thus, regulators rejected coal-fired power plants in large
percentages across the country during the study period, but were less likely to
reject other, less risky, energy infrastructure.  When politicians intervened to
influence regulatory processes, they did so in ways that seemed to reflect
regional ideological preferences about the energy future more than capture.
While New York politicians changed state laws to prevent local governments
from authorizing fracking,237 Texas and Oklahoma politicians changed their
states’ laws to prevent local governments from restricting fracking.238  Cali-
fornia’s governor took strong action to ensure the development of solar
power over the objections of NGOs.239  President Trump overruled the
Obama administration’s rejection of the Keystone XL Pipeline.240  And so
on.
This is a tug-of-war model of regulation in a capitalist democracy: a strug-
gle in which regulators exercise bounded discretion241 subject to rarely used
legislative242 and executive intervention.243  In that context NGOs serve as
sounders of alarms seeking to trigger political pressure on regulators;244 and
the behavior of NGOs in this data set seems consistent with that story.  Lead
agencies try to balance reliability, affordability, and environmental perform-
ance in the energy system in ways that may tilt toward reliability and
affordability more often and toward environmental performance less often
than NGOs prefer; presumably, industry and proponents of development
perceive an opposite bias in the process.  Therefore, businesses and NGOs
236 See, e.g., Konisky et al., supra note 127, at 27–28.
237 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
241 See generally Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a
Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996); David B. Spence,
Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413
(1999).
242 See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 176 (1984) (explaining that Con-
gress does not usually intervene but prefers a “fire alarm” approach); see also Barry R. Wein-
gast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking
by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 792 (1983).
243 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 20, 37–42.
244 McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 242, at 166 (articulating this idea).
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alike mobilize to try to put a finger on the scale of that balancing process,
often enlisting elected politicians to impose pressure from above.
The propensity of NGOs to mobilize around risk may reflect the incen-
tive structure NGOs face in an era of “post-truth” politics, one characterized
by insulated communities of belief rather than truth-oriented delibera-
tion.245  Indeed, it seems almost self-evident that polarization and digital
interconnectedness are facilitating (and speeding) the spread and persis-
tence of false belief, though that problem may be easier to recognize in our
ideological adversaries than in ourselves.246  In the regulation of energy mar-
ket entry, repeated, intense conflict over increasingly disparate and urgent
visions of an energy future, fought using modern digital communication
techniques, can feed fragmented belief ecosystems in which beliefs harden.
Within these ecosystems, members may amplify especially dreaded or unfa-
miliar risks, and members may consume risk information that has been
filtered in biased ways.  That tendency toward biased filtering of new infor-
mation heightens the primacy effect,247 suggesting a race between NGOs and
businesses to shape the public’s first impressions of energy projects using
appeals most likely to resonate—risk-based appeals.248
Troublingly, the data suggest that misperceptions or misrepresentations
of risk are fairly commonly injected into siting conflicts.  This is not a new
feature of siting regulation, but its speed, frequency, and effectiveness may be
on the rise.  The idea that regulators sometimes reject (or never get the
opportunity to consider) projects whose measurable risks are small and bene-
fits large has long troubled the risk regulation community, including com-
mentators like then-Judge Stephen Breyer,249 Cass Sunstein,250 John
Graham, and Jonathan Wiener.251  Popular misunderstanding of risks can
lead responsive politicians and regulators to misdirect public resources away
from larger risks and toward smaller ones.252  One rejoinder to this concern
245 Antonio Garcı́a Martı́nez, Facebook, Snapchat and the Dawn of the Post-Truth Era,
WIRED (May 25, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-snapchat-and-the-dawn-
of-the-post-truth-era/.
246 See Nickerson, supra note 107, at 188 (crediting confirmation bias with helping to
preserve false belief and with overestimations of the evidence in support of any belief); see
also Martı́nez, supra note 245 (crediting digital media platforms for elevating belief over
truth).
247 The primacy effect refers to the idea that we give more weight to the information we
receive first about a particular issue. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance
of First Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 286 (1983).
248 See, e.g., Vasi et al., supra note 29, at 934 (“Local screenings of [the documentary]
Gasland contributed to anti-fracking mobilizations, which, in turn, affected the passage of
local fracking moratoria . . . .”).
249 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 3–21 (1993).
250 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 17, 62, 142 (2005).
251 John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS.
RISK 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Weiner eds. 1995) (making precisely this point).
252 Following the EPA’s earlier recognition that Superfund site risk was overestimated
by the lay public, James Hamilton and Kip Viscusi showed that Superfund cleanups spent
hundreds of millions of dollars per death averted, which at the time was more than fifty
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is that because our ability to quantify (or detect) risk is limited, public alarm
is not illogical; indeed, decisionmakers ought to be cautious about permit-
ting land uses that provoke legitimate worries about poorly understood
risks.253  These arguments are essentially invocations of the precautionary
principle, admonitions of humility when undertaking actions that affect com-
plex ecosystems.
On the other hand, regulators know that siting decisions also implicate
the most common rejoinder to the precautionary principle: namely that in
dynamic energy markets both action and inaction affect the magnitude and
distribution of risks254 depending upon the context.  We have already noted
that the dearth of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in New York and New
England means that energy prices there will be more expensive than they
might otherwise be,255 and that New England will sometimes import Russian
LNG and burn dirtier diesel fuel and coal to generate electricity.256  Stop-
ping an oil pipeline may mean that more oil will be shipped by rail, increas-
ing the risk of a spill.257  And stopping a utility-scale solar or wind farm, or
times the figure used in the EPA’s own cost-benefit analyses. JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP
VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS? 1–2, 189–90 (1999).  Some scholars worry that basing policy
on misperceptions of risk threatens more fundamental values: that when a society allows
belief to trump scientific fact in the policy process, the result may be not only bad policy,
but oppression. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk, 3 RISK 59,
68–69 (1992) (drawing connections between historical preferences for belief over science
to the rise of oppressive authoritarian regimes).
253 See Cross, supra note 252, at 60.
254 SUNSTEIN, supra note 250, at 62 (“[A]dverse effects may come from inaction, regula-
tion, and everything between.”).
255 April Lee, January’s Cold Weather Affects Electricity Generation Mix in Northeast, Mid-
Atlantic, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=34632.
256 See, e.g., Steve Everly, Why Natural Gas from Putin’s Russia Has to Be Imported to New
England, WASH. EXAMINER, (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opin
ion/op-eds/why-natural-gas-from-putins-russia-has-to-be-imported-to-new-england; Nau-
reen S. Malik, Cold Snap Makes New England the World’s Priciest Gas Market, BOS. GLOBE (Dec.
27, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/12/27/cold-snap-makes-new-
england-world-priciest-gas-market/ILRzKrRTCtW4uNYRZeEIvK/story.html.  This conclu-
sion holds true as long as natural gas remains the marginal fuel in the New England and
New York electricity markets, as it is now. See DAVID B. PATTON ET AL., POTOMAC ECON.,
QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE NEW YORK ISO ELECTRICITY MARKETS: THIRD QUARTER OF 2017,
at 16 (2017), https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
NYISO-Quarterly-Report_2017-Q3__11-22-2017_Final.pdf (concluding that natural gas and
hydroelectric power were the marginal fuels in the New York market); Key Grid and Market
Stats, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2019)
(estimating that natural gas is the marginal fuel in the New England market seventy per-
cent of the time).
257 That sort of reasoning led the left-leaning editorial page of a major Texas newspa-
per to support the controversial Trans-Pecos Pipeline because the natural gas it delivers to
Mexico will reduce haze pollution in Big Bend National Park by supplying natural gas to
Mexico and displacing coal-fired power in the Mexican electric generation mix. Editorial:
Trans-Pecos Pipeline Protest Is Misplaced, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 16, 2016), https://
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the transmission line necessary to connect it to the grid, will increase spot
electricity prices for consumers and benefit competitor technologies, includ-
ing (perhaps) dirtier fossil-fueled energy or more expensive distributed
renewable energy.  There may be environmental justice aspects to these
opportunity costs as well: when decisionmakers choose a more expensive
option—to prioritize reliability or environmental performance over
affordability—those higher costs will impose a disproportionate burden on
relatively poor energy consumers.258  These situational consequences of sit-
ing decisions may loom larger to regulators than to NGOs.  For national
NGOs, opposing fossil fuel infrastructure may make sense regardless of these
shorter-term environmental costs as they pursue a strategy aimed at avoiding
“carbon lock-in,” the idea that new fossil fuel infrastructure now slows decar-
bonization by making fossil fuel cheaper in the future.259
Indeed, some commentators argue that risk amplification by NGOs is
illogical but harmless.  Peter Sandman has noted that even though “the risks
that kill people and the risks that upset them are completely different,” pub-
lic alarm and outrage force elites to include the lay public in risk regulation
disputes, ultimately yielding more democratically legitimate decisions.260
Writing in the 1980s, Sandman argued that the truth will eventually win
out.261  But that sort of optimism seems less warranted in today’s digital, post-
truth environment.  The work of Noah Friedkin and Francesco Bullo sheds
some light on the spread of true versus false beliefs in the connected digital
world.  They find that when a false belief predominates in nested groups
(groups that communicate with one another) the truth about risk eventually
tends to win out if “any individual who understands the relevant science or
mathematics must come to the [truthful] conclusion.”262  However, Friedkin
www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2016/06/16/editorial-trans-pecos-pipeline-pro-
test-is-misplaced/.
258 This effect is particularly ironic (perverse?) when one considers the wealth effects of
NIMBY opposition.  If wealthy communities veto energy infrastructure, thereby foreclosing
energy service options or increasing the cost of energy, the wealthy will be better able to
adjust to this state of affairs.  Opposition to natural gas infrastructure in New York has
hampered gas utilities’ ability to import cheap, plentiful natural gas from out of state,
which has led one New York utility to deny new natural gas hookups to residential custom-
ers.  Wealthier homeowners are responding by installing more expensive, geothermal
home heating systems, an option that is unavailable to poorer residents. See Kaya
Laterman, Converting to Geothermal Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2019) https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/08/09/realestate/converting-to-geothermal-energy.html.
259 For discussions of this idea, see Adelman & Spence, supra note 59, at 3483–86; R.T.
Dahowski & J.J. Dooley, Carbon Management Strategies for US Electricity Generation Capacity: A
Vintage-Based Approach, 29 ENERGY 1589, 1596–97 (2004); and Steven J. Davis et al., Future
CO2 Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure, 329 SCIENCE 1330, 1333
(2010).
260 PETER M. SANDMAN, RESPONDING TO COMMUNITY OUTRAGE 2, 3–5, 112–13 (2012 ed.)
(1993), http://petersandman.com/media/RespondingtoCommunityOutrage.pdf.
261 Id. at 49–60.
262 Noah E. Friedkin & Franceso Bullo, How Truth Wins in Opinion Dynamics Along Issue
Sequences, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,380, 11,384 (2017).
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and Bullo caution that this finding does not hold “when social movements or
social media elevate the adoption of a particular set of false facts and
logic.”263  In the Trump era, the elevation of false facts and logic seems more
common, suggesting that filter bubbles may be insular, and that many groups
are not “nested” in larger social networks.  Our data revealed some examples
of multiple NGOs sharing common false or dubious messaging, including
claims about wind turbine syndrome, radio frequency radiation from trans-
mission lines and smart meters, and exaggerations of risks associated with
nuclear power and fracking.264  We cannot know from the limited informa-
tion we have whether those observations reflect the kind of filter-bubble-gen-
erated false belief described by Friedkin and Bullo, but they may.
Regardless, if regulators have access to the scientific and mathematical
expertise that Friedkin and Bullo say enables truth to win out,265 perhaps the
amplification of risk will not matter because regulators will not let it skew
their decisions.266  But this is an unsatisfying answer for two reasons.  First,
our data support an inference that investors are less likely to propose projects
in places where NGO opposition is strong.267  Stated differently, when NGO
opposition apparently deters proposal of some energy projects, society loses
the net benefit of those never-proposed projects that regulators would other-
wise have approved.  If one assumes that regulators pursue (their sense of)
the public interest, that net benefit would most often be positive; if not, it
may often be negative.  Second, it may be that the transition to a reliable,
affordable, and cleaner energy future depends upon more than independent
regulators: it may ultimately depend on broader public consensus about how
to balance reliability, affordability, and environmental performance.  Appar-
ently, given existing policy and market incentives, any transition to a cleaner
energy mix will not happen fast enough to avert serious adverse climate
263 Id.
264 See discussion supra Section III.B.
265 That might not be so in situations involving highly technical energy projects where
there could arise large information asymmetries between regulators and the regulated.
For example, in deepwater offshore oil and gas production, regulators might not be able to
assess risk nearly as well as companies can.  That seems less likely to be the case in the
project categories studied here.
266 This may be another reason why our data suggest that local NGOs more often
resorted to hyperbolic risk arguments than national NGOs because the latter may have
more access than the former to scientific expertise.
267 This is a more general version of the dynamic documented in parts of the environ-
mental justice literature.  Hamilton, supra note 150, at 128–29 (attributing a race and pov-
erty bias in siting hazardous waste facilities to firms’ avoidance of politically active
communities).  A wind developer in upstate New York claimed to be able to estimate the
intensity of local opposition to proposed projects this way: “If the number of vacation
homes in that town were high, there was going to be a high level of opposition there. . . . If
it was low, there would be low opposition.  That was true town to town across upstate New
York.” RUSSELL GOLD, SUPERPOWER 105 (2019).
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impacts.268  Speeding the transition will require collective decisions about
how to incentivize lower- or zero-carbon technologies.  Those decisions, in
turn, implicate a suite of difficult value judgments about how to manage
energy reliability and affordability during the transition.
That kind of broader agreement seems particularly elusive in today’s
political environment, and speculating about how that might come to pass is
beyond the scope of this article.  The demise of Clean Line Energy, a
merchant transmission firm dedicated to building transmission to support
midwestern wind farms, illustrates this risk.  Its mission was to build the trans-
mission network that would allow cheap, clean wind power from the plains
states to reach eastern markets.269  Despite the clear positive net benefits of
its proposed projects, most have been stymied by local opposition, much of it
based on the dissemination of false information by local groups.270  The kind
of affordable rapid green transition necessary to forestall the worst impacts of
global warming implies the need to build interstate transition to support util-
ity-scale wind and solar projects, and soon.  The Clean Line experience does
not offer much hope in that regard.
Nevertheless, this analysis suggests some constructive steps that NGOs
could take to further that agenda.  If, as the data suggest, NGOs are cooperat-
ing with one another effectively to coordinate their opposition to fossil fuel
infrastructure, those same NGOs271 ought to be able to cooperate to pro-
mote less expensive, utility-scale clean energy infrastructure as well.  Actively
supporting proposals to build clean energy infrastructure may require NGOs
to do some organizational (and cultural) retooling, since most were built to
oppose rather than support development.  It may also sometimes pit national
NGOs against local NGOs (including local affiliates) when the latter oppose
clean energy infrastructure.  Sierra Club, for example, has struggled to advo-
cate for clean energy projects over the opposition of its local chapters,272 and
required “lengthy internal discussion” in order to decide to support a major
transmission line project that would carry wind power to market in Missouri,
268 Davenport, supra note 10 (summarizing experts’ conclusion that the pace of change
is too slow to meet global warming targets established in the Paris Agreement on climate
change).
269 See GOLD, supra note 267, for a book-length chronicle of the company’s rise and
fall.
270 Gold chronicles numerous false and misleading statements by various project oppo-
nents, from local organizers to Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee. Id. at 249–51.
271 There are, of course, research-oriented national environmental NGOs, like
Resources for the Future (economic analysis) or the Environmental Defense Fund (scien-
tific research) already working to address energy tradeoffs and promote workable solutions
to tradeoff problems.  They almost never intervene in siting proceedings.  This suggestion
is aimed at NGOs with stronger histories of opposing energy development legally and polit-
ically; they could put their legal and political expertise to work supporting individual pro-
posed clean energy projects, even over local opposition.
272 See Corkery, supra note 22 (discussing the Northern Pass transmission line); Owens,
supra note 168 (discussing the Mojave Desert solar projects).
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Arkansas, and other states.273  Nonetheless, if national NGOs become more
active in support of green energy infrastructure projects, their more con-
servative approach to risk-based claims in cases involving non-fossil-fuel infra-
structure may act as a counterweight to local NGOs’ claims about risks of
clean energy infrastructure, neutralizing local opposition and improving the
probability of project success.  National NGOs may wish to look to a new
initiative by Columbia University’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
called the “Renewable Energy Legal Defense Initiative,” which organizes
legal assistance to defend renewable energy projects against opposition
attacks.274  A broader NGO effort to support green energy infrastructure
might blunt the effects of local mobilization in opposition to these sorts of
projects.
In the meantime, the regulation of market entry will continue along the
familiar course depicted in this analysis, one in which holders of private capi-
tal propose projects on which they think they can earn attractive returns.
Some combination of national and local NGOs then use mostly risk-based
arguments to mobilize the broader public in political opposition to those
project proposals.  Then regulators decide whether or not the projects are
consistent with their respective statutory mandates.  That process allows room
for ideological heterogeneity to drive different choices in different contexts:
pursuing decarbonization at some places and times and traditional energy
infrastructure at other places and times.  Viewed one way, however, that pro-
cess reflects the dysfunction, emotion, and polarization of American politics.
Viewed another way, it looks almost Madisonian—a system in which passions
collide in the application of siting regimes, and it is up to regulators to strike
the balance that reflects the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.275
273 GOLD, supra note 267, at 141, 166, 183.
274 See Michael Gerrard & John Dernbach, How Lawyers Can Help Save the Planet,
LAW360 (May 21, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1160147/how-lawyers-can-help-
save-the-planet.
275 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (defin-
ing factions as agents of temporary passions, and foes of the “permanent and aggregate
interests of the community”).
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF NGOS’ TACTICAL AND ISSUE ARGUMENT
CHOICES ACROSS PROJECT TYPES
TABLE A-1: NGO TACTICAL CHOICES (% USING)
Tactics
Total % all groups
(% nat’l / % local)
Econ
# of Orgs Legal Political
Technology Protest Pressure /
(nat’l / local) Interven’n Mobiliz’n
Boycott
Fossil-Fueled 56 52 50 36 0
Plants (8/48) (75/48) (50/50) (25/38) (0/0)
79 86 82 61 11
Pipelines
(30/49) (80/89) (70/89) (56/63) (23/4)
93 16 52 37 5
Fracking
(20/73) (15/16) (75/45) (35/38) (0/6)
67 30 83 58 4
LNG
(30/37) (23/35) (96/73) (60/56) (6/3)
Utility-Scale 46 39 63 20 6
Solar (8/39) (50/36) (87/57) (25/18) (25/2)
82 37 54 2 2
Wind
(16/66) (37/37) (58/44) (0/3) (0/3)
Transmission 57 19 74 1 0
Lines (16/41) (13/21) (50/83) (0/2) (0/0)
26 58 62 8 0
Nuclear
(9/17) (77/47) (67/59) (11/6) (0/0)
20 30 80 15 0
Smart Meter
(3/17) (33/29) (100/76) (0/18) (0/0
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TABLE A-2: NGO ISSUE CHOICES
Issues
Total % all groups
(% nat’l / % local)
# of Orgs Justice /
Technology Economic Envt’l Health
(nat’l / local) Fairness
Fossil-Fueled 56 34 73 57 23
Plants (8/48) (25/35) (88/71) (62/56) (13/25)
79 34 92 73 23
Pipelines
(30/49) (33/35) (90/94) (70/76) (20/24)
93 20 67 67 4
Fracking
(20/73) (25/19) (80/63) (80/63) 10/3)
67 46 55 55 21
LNG
(30/37) (50/43) (52/43) (24/31) (33/11)
Utility-Scale 46 24 76 15 7
Solar (8/38) (13/26) (100/71) (0/18) (0/8)
82 48 73 53 10
Wind
(16/66) (43/49) (63/76) (37/58) (13/9)
Transmission 57 56 63 30 0
Lines (16/41) (65/31) (56/65) (13/36) (0/0)
26 31 96 65 4
Nuclear
(9/18) (33/29) (77/100) (78/59) (0/6)
Smart 20 25 10 100 0
Meters (3/17) (33/23) (33/5) (100/100) (0/0)
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APPENDIX B:  GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF NGOS AND PROJECTS
Fossil-Fueled Power Plants
Fossil-fueled power plants can be constructed wherever a suitable site
can be found and are not relegated to particular regions of the country.  Dur-
ing the study period, projects were proposed all over the country.
No. of Major Fossil-Fueled Power No. of Anti-Power-Plant NGOs in
Plant Projects Proposed During the the Data Set (max=10; min=0)
Study Period, by State (max=10;
min=0)
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
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Pipelines
During the study period, pipeline project proposals centered in the new
oil and gas production regions running north-south through the center of
the country from Texas to North Dakota (including Colorado), heading to
markets in the Northeast, mid-Atlantic region, and Southeast.  The highest
concentration of pipeline projects sought to bring oil from the production
areas in Alberta to connect to existing pipelines in the north central United
States or to bring natural gas into New England.  One anti-pipeline NGO, the
Fractracker Alliance, produced a 2014 map of pipeline projects that is illus-
trative of the distribution of projects geographically.  That map is available
on the FracTracker Alliance website.276
No. of Antipipeline NGOs in the Data Set, by State (max=12; min=0)
276 Ted Auch, North American Pipeline Proposal Map, FRACTRACKER ALLIANCE (Mar. 14,
2014), https://www.fractracker.org/2014/03/proposed-pipelines/.
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Fracking
Major Oil & Gas Shale Plays
Fracking can only occur where deposits of hydrocarbon-containing shale
layers exist.  Sizeable American shale plays exist in the following states (mov-
ing west to east): California, Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota, Texas,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York.  For
more data on existing shale plays in the United States, see the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s current map of shale plays in a conference
paper written by Aaditya Khanal, Mo Khoshghadam, and William John
Lee.277  The states of Vermont, New York and Maryland have imposed state-
wide bans on fracking.278
Natural Gas Production, Top Pro- Oil Production, Top Producing
ducing States (% U.S. Production; States (% U.S. Production;
max=26%; min=0%) max=26%; min=0%)
Data Source: U.S. Energy Data Source: U.S. Energy
Information Administration Information Administration
277 Aaditya Khanal et al., Effect of Well Spacing on Productivity of Liquid Rich Shale (LRS)




278 Hurdle, supra note 157.
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No. of Antifracking NGOs, by State, in Data Set279 (max=13; min=0)
279 Note that the State of New York sits atop a large shale gas deposit, and banned
fracking within its borders during the study period.  For that reason it is not a large pro-
ducing state, but it might have been had it not imposed the statewide ban.
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LNG Terminals
Geographic Distribution of Projects
Because LNG terminals involve filling or emptying ocean-going tankers,
they must be situated on the coast or just offshore.  The largest concentration
of proposed LNG terminals was on the Gulf Coast in Texas and Louisiana (9
proposed projects in each state).  Additional Gulf Coast projects were pro-
posed in Mississippi (2) and Florida (1).  And there were projects proposed
during the study period on the Atlantic Coast in Massachusetts (2), Maryland
(1), Pennsylvania (1), New York (1) on the Pacific Coast in Oregon (1), and
in Alaska (1).
The LNG data set featured an unusually large number of national NGOs
(30/67).  The state NGO numbers are reported in the figure below.  How-
ever, certain projects attracted specific opposition from national NGOs as
well.  Among the NGOs in our data set the 3 LNG projects attracting the
largest number of NGO opponents (including national NGOs) were: (1) the
Cove Point Terminal in Maryland (31 NGOs), (2) the Jordan Cove Project in
Oregon (15 NGOs), and (3) the Port Ambrose Project in New York (12
NGOs).
No. of Local Anti-LNG NGOs in Data Set, by State (max=8; min=0)
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Solar Power Projects
Geographic Distribution of Projects
Solar power potential in the United States is highest in the desert south-
west.  All else equal, one would expect development to be concentrated in
area stretching east from southern California through Nevada, Arizona, New
Mexico, and West Texas, and neighboring states to the north.  Utility-scale
solar development elsewhere can be spurred by state policy incentives irre-
spective of solar power potential.
There is no compendium of utility-scale solar projects (failed and suc-
cessful) covering the study period.  The states with the most installed solar
capacity (most of which was built during the study period) are280:
• California (>20GW)





• New Jersey (~3GW)
• Massachusetts (>2GW)
• New York (>1.5GW)
• Utah (~1.5GW)
The projects opposed by the NGOs in our data set were located in:
• California (26)
• Nevada (6)





• North Carolina (1)
The NGOs in our data set were distributed similarly: 17 were located in Cali-
fornia, 8 in New Jersey, with 1 or 2 each in 6 other states.
280 These data come from Top 10 Solar States, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, https://
www.seia.org/research-resources/top-10-solar-states-0 (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
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Wind Farms
All else equal, the best locations for wind farms are in the central plains
and offshore where winds are strong and steady.  In addition, some states
offer policy incentives for wind development.
Wind Projects and Capacity in the Lower Forty-Eight States
Figure Source: American Wind Energy Association
Types of Projects Opposed by NGOs in the Data Set
Ridgeline: 22
Plains: 20
Coastal or Offshore: 9
No. of Antiwind NGOs in Data Set, by State
(max = 7; min = 0)
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Transmission Lines
Geographic Distribution of Projects
For this analysis we were able to identify all major transmission projects
proposed in the lower forty-eight states during the study period.  Many were
designed to alleviate congestion in the market and improve system reliability
in parts of the U.S. grid that were overcrowded, but many others aimed to
bring renewable power from the windy central plains, or solar power from
the desert southwest, to urban areas.
No. of Major Transmission Projects No. of Antitransmission NGOs in
Proposed During the Study Period, the data set, by State
by State (max=8; min=0)
(max=6; min=0)
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Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear power plants require a sizeable source of water for cooling and
are typically located in rural areas.  The Energy Policy Act of 2015 offered
powerful incentives for the construction of new nuclear power plants, trigger-
ing proposals for more than a dozen new plants, most of them in the
Southeast.281
Distribution of Nuclear Power Plant Distribution of Antinuclear NGOs in
Project Proposals, by State Data Set, by State
(max=3; min=0) (max=4; min=0)
The project economics of nuclear power took a turn for the worse dur-
ing the study period leading to most of the proposals being abandoned.  The
only proposed plants that made it to the construction phase were in Georgia
and South Carolina.
281 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
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Smart Meters
The rollout of smart meters to residential customers occurred almost
entirely within the study period, at various locations across the country.
Smart-Meter Deployment Among Residential Customers, 2016
Figure Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration282
Anti-Smart-Meter NGOs in Data Set, by State (max=3, min=0)
282 Nearly Half of All U.S. Electricity Customers Have Smart Meters, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34012.
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Citizen Ideology, by State, 2016283






283 Citizen ideology data taken from Updated Measures of Citizen and Government Ideology,
RICHARD C. FORDING, https://www.dropbox.com/s/nwinaepsjltoshq/stateideology_v2018
.xlsx?dl=0  (last updated June 18, 2018).  These scores are calculated as described in Wil-
liam D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93,
42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998).
